Gary DeWaal’s Bridging the Week: September 30 to October 4, and October 7, 2013 (Compliance Officers, SEFs and AIF Reporting)

In a week punctuated by the beginning of trading on Swap Execution Facilities and the simultaneous shut down of the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, other important developments occurred internationally and in the US relevant to all financial service participants. These matters included:

  • Compliance officers are in the cross hairs once again of the UK FCA and the US SEC: UK Compliance Officer sued by the FCA, while the SEC issued a Frequency Asked Questions regarding the potential liability of legal and compliance officers for business persons under a failure to supervise theory (with Valuable Lessons Learned);
  • ADM Investor Services, Inc. was fined by the CFTC for segregation violations (with Valuable Lessons Learned);
  • CFTC issued FAQs related to commodity options;
  • CFTC issued No-Action relief related to SEFs just prior to closing its doors, including to an Australian (but not European) multilateral trading facility offering swaps to US persons;
  • ESMA finalized alternative investment funds’ reporting requirements;
  • EUREX scheduled implementation of its Excessive System Usage Fee and Order to Trade Ratio to discourage High Frequency Trading; and additional articles too.

Video Overview:

 

Article Overview:

Compliance Officers in the Cross Hairs by the UK FCA and the US SEC (with Valuable Lessons Learned)

Last week, the UK Financial Conduct Authority again took disciplinary action against a UK-based compliance officer, while the US Securities and Exchange Commission issued guidance regarding what activities compliance and legal officers at broker dealers can take in furtherance of their roles without being regarded as supervisors of business line personnel and potentially being liable for such persons’ law or rule violations under a failure to supervise theory.

FCA Action

The FCA enforcement action involved Alison Moran, the former compliance officer of Catalyst Investment Group Limited, a UK-based company authorized by the FCA to engage in a wide-range of investment activities.

From October 2007 through May 2010 Catalyst had promoted and arranged transactions involving bonds for ARM, a Luxembourg incorporated securitization vehicle. However, beginning in November 2007, ARM believed it required a license from the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF), the Luxembourg financial regulator, to issue such bonds (“ARM Bonds”). However, it never obtained a license.

According to the FCA, Catalyst (1) became aware of ARM’s views on licensing during November 2007; (2) knew ARM applied for a license from CSSF in July 2009; yet (3) continued to promote and arrange transactions in ARM Bonds through May 2010 knowing that ARM never obtained a license. This was even after November 20, 2009, when CSSF issued a notice expressly requiring ARM to cease promoting and arranging transactions in ARM bonds until ARM was licensed, and Catalyst became aware of this notice too.

Previously, on July 27, 2009, Ms. Moran became aware that ARM had earlier that month applied for a license from CSSF. On December 10, 2009, Ms. Moran became aware of CSSF’s notice to ARM to cease issuing bonds on November 20, 2009. Finally on December 24, 2009, Ms. Moran became aware it was mandatory for ARM to have a license to issue bonds. ARM’s request for a license from CSSF was formally rejected by CSSF on August 29, 2011.

FCA charged Ms. Moran with a breach of its Principle 6, which required her to exercise due skill, care and diligence in managing Catalyst’s compliance function. The basis for this charge was that Ms. Moran did not seek to understand why ARM might be applying for a license from CSSF during July 2009 and the consequence of ARM not obtaining a license. As a result she did not seek to amend Catalyst’s financial promotions related to ARM bonds.

Moreover, even after Ms. Moran became aware during December 2009 that CSSF had requested ARM not to issue bonds any further because it required a license, she still did not seek to amend Catalyst’s financial promotions. Among other things, Ms. Moran permitted Catalyst to send a letter to financial intermediaries during December 2009, and investors during March 2010, that FCA adjudged misleading regarding the status of ARM. According to FCA, Ms. Moran accepted that, in hindsight, these letters ‘did not give the full picture.”

As a result of these matters, Ms. Moran was fined by FCA GB £20,000 (US $32,000) while Catalyst was censured. Were Catalyst able to pay a fine, FCA says it would have fined the company GB £450,000 (US $720,000).

In addition, the former CEO of Catalyst, Timothy Roberts, has been fined GB £450,000 (US $720,000) and permanently banned from the industry, while Andrew Wilkins, a former director, has been fined GB £100,000 (US $160,000) and barred from holding senior roles in the industry, as a result of their involvement with Catalyst’s promotion and arrangements to sell ARM bonds.

In July 2012, the UK Financial Services Authority (predecessor to the FCA) issued total penalties of GB £70,258 against David Davis, the former chief compliance officer of the broker Paul E Schweder Miller & Co. related to his violation of FCA Principle 6 too. (For more information on this matter see: http://www.garydewaalandassociates.com/bridging-the-week-august-5-9-and-august-12-2013/.)

SEC Frequently Asked Questions regarding Legal and Compliance Officers’ Potential Liability under a Failure to Supervise Theory

Separately, on September 30, the US SEC issued a “Frequently Asked Questions,” about the potential liability of compliance and legal personnel of US registered broker dealers for failure to supervise. While acknowledging “the critical role” compliance and legal personnel perform in efforts by BDs to comply with legal and regulatory requirements, applicable law “does not presume that a BD’s compliance legal personnel are supervisors solely by virtue of their compliance or legal functions.”

However, claims the SEC, compliance and legal personnel could be responsible as supervisors of business persons - even where they have no express supervisory authority for such persons — because liability for supervision requires a “fact and circumstances determination.” According to the SEC:

“…the question is whether compliance or legal personnel have supervisory authority over business units or other personnel outside the compliance and legal departments as could be the case, for example, if a chief executive or operating officer also is the firm’s chief compliance officer. Supervisory authority also can be implicitly delegated to, or assumed by compliance or legal personnel.”

Although the SEC’s FAQs did not break new ground, they are a reminder to compliance and legal personnel at BDs that the SEC might seek to hold them liable for violations of law by business line personnel under certain circumstances. The SEC might consider supervision of such persons implicitly delegated to compliance or legal personnel (even where the organization chart of a firm clearly shows no supervisory link) if such personnel had,

“…the power to affect another’s conduct. Did the person for example, have the ability to hire, reward or punish that person… Did the person otherwise have the authority and responsibility such that he or she could have prevented the violation from continuing even if he or she did not have the power to fire, demote or reduce the pay of the person in question?”

Valuable Lessons Learned: The expectations of regulators regarding Chief Compliance Officers and other compliance and legal staff are increasing. Under applicable US Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulations, for example, CCOs must have the authority to perform a number of express responsibilities, including taking reasonable steps to ensure their firm’s compliance with applicable provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC rules. As a result, firms’ Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officers, as well as the CCOs themselves, must ensure that CCOs have that authority not just in theory but in practice too. Red flags of potential law violations (particularly material ones) that come to CCOs’ attention should be systemically followed-up and appropriate actions taken. CCOs should consider maintaining a log or other documentation of all such red flags and follow-up.

For more details regarding the obligations of CCOs under CFTC regulations and the Annual Compliance Report, see an article on this website: http://www.garydewaalandassociates.com/its-10-pm-fcms-sds-msps-do-you-know-the-status-of-your-firms-2013-annual-compliance-report-preparation/.

ADM Investor Services, Inc. Fined by CFTC for Segregation Violations (with Valuable Lessons Learned)

The CFTC again last week charged and settled with a Futures Commission Merchant related to its violations of requirements related to the handling of customer funds. In this matter involving ADM Investor Services, Inc., the firm included in its positions and funds separately set aside for customers (as required by applicable law and regulations), positions and funds associated with accounts of various of its affiliates. These accounts should have been considered “non-customer” says the CFTC and not included among customer-segregated funds.

ADMIS transferred its non-customer positions and associated funds out of customer segregated accounts during July 2011. For this matter, ADMIS was fined US $425,000.

Valuable Lessons Learned: As a result of various actions against FCMs by the CFTC over the past few months, FCMs have a useful checklist of technical offenses they should seek to avoid in connection with their handling of customer funds. Again, given the “zero tolerance” stand of the CFTC in connection with customer funds’ offenses, FCMs should review their policies and procedures, as well as staffing, to ensure that that they comply with all requirements regarding the handling of customer funds, including that,

    • they have sufficient processes and resources to help ensure that customer funds are placed in the first instance, and subsequently maintained, in the right funds’ protection bucket (i.e., segregated, secured, or cleared swaps);
    • no affiliated persons’ positions or funds are included in such buckets;
    • customer funds are held only at approved depositories with proper acknowledgements; and
    • they timely report to the CFTC and their Designated Self Regulatory Organization any violations related to their handling of customer funds as required by applicable rules.

Periodic testing of firms’ compliance with these requirements by firm’s’ internal audit or other control functions, or by a third party, may also be advisable.

Briefly:

  • CFTC Issues FAQs related to Commodity Options: On September 30, the CFTC’s Division of Market Oversight issued “Frequently Asked Questions regarding Commodity Options.” Among other matters addressed were whether there are any exceptions to the requirement that commodity options must be regulated as swaps (yes — an option involving a physical as opposed to a financial commodity, including a trade option), and the record-keeping and reporting obligations for trade option participants.
  • CFTC Issues No Action related to Swap Execution Facilities: The CFTC issued a flurry of no action relief to accommodate the rollout of Swap Execution Facilities on October 2 just prior to closing its doors on October 1. Among other no action relief granted was relief to:
    • Yieldbroker Pty Limited, an Australian-based and regulated multilateral trading facility that offers swaps to buyers and sellers, including US persons. Until November 1 at 12:01 am, Yieldbroker may continue to accommodate US persons without being registered as a SEF (Yieldbroker filed with the Division of Market Oversight on September 27 a provisional application as a SEF). No equivalent relief was granted to any European-based MTF; and
    • Clearing FCMs, who were provided additional time to pre-screen orders automatically for compliance with risk-based limits, and certain SEFs who were granted additional time to comply with their requirement to facilitate such pre-screening by clearing FCMs. This relief also expires as of 12:01 am on November 1 and SEFs seeking to take advantage of the relief must file certain information with the CFTC by October 10.

For my reflections on the inauguration of SEFs, check out an article on this website: http://www.garydewaalandassociates.com/today-there-are-sefs-the-final-piece-in-a-pablo-picasso-abstract-rendition-of-effective-swaps-regulation/.

  • CFTC Reminds Registrants Through an Enforcement Action That It Requires Mandatory Books and Records to Be Produced When It Asks: The CFTC commenced an administrate enforcement action against Dominick Anthony Cognata, a registered floor broker on the Commodity Exchange Inc. in NY (now part of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange) for his failure to comply with requests for books and records related to his trading activity. At the same time, the Commission issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke the Registration of Mr. Cognata. The documents requested by the CFTC included trading cards, order tickets and other records related to Mr. Cognata’s trading of silver and gold futures and futures options. Mr. Cognata declined to produce the requested documents invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. According to the CFTC, “[t]he Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to records such as those requested by the Division staff…which are required by law to be kept as records of transactions subject to government regulation.”
  • ESMA Finalizes Alternative Investment Funds Reporting Requirements: Last week the European Securities and Market Authority issued final guidelines on the reporting obligations of alternative investment fund managers (e.g., hedge funds, private equity and real estate funds). Among other matters, AIFs will have to report to their national supervisors on a regular basis information related to their investment strategies, exposure and portfolio concentration. ESMA also proposed that AIFs be required to report information related to their risk measures, liquidity profile and leverage. Following publication of these guidelines on ESMA’s website in the official languages of the EU, national authorities will have two months to confirm to ESMA whether they comply or intend to comply with these Guidelines.
  • EUREX Schedules Implementation of Excessive System Usage Fee and Order to Trade Ratio to Discourage High Frequency Trading: EUREX announced on September 27 that beginning December 1, 2013, it will introduce its Order to Trade Calculation regime. If during a month, a EUREX participant’s order volume exceeds the exchange established order volume limit for a particular product, the participant may be fined by EUREX. Also on December 1, EUREX will be introducing daily limits for the number of transactions sent by a Participant and assessing fees for transactions in excess of those limits. These provisions have been adopted by EUREX to reduce the volume of orders by High Frequency Traders in particular.

For source documents, visit:

CFTC v. ADM Investor Services Inc:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfadmorder093013.pdf

CFTC v. Dominick Cognata:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfcognatanotice093013.pdf

CFTC FAQs related to Commodity Options:
https://forms.cftc.gov/_layouts/TradeOptions/Docs/TradeOptionsFAQ.pdf

CFTC SEF-related Relief:
Pre-execution Screening:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/13-62.pdf
Yieldbroker:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/13-59.pdf

Compliance Officer Potential Liability:
FCA v. Catalyst:
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/catalyst-investment-group-limited.pdf
FCA v. Alison Moran:
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/alison-moran.pdf
SEC FAQs about the Potential Liability of Compliance and Legal Personnel at Broker Dealers:
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-cco-supervision-093013.htm

ESMA Reporting Requirements for Alternative Fund Managers:
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2013-1368_press_release_aifmd_reporting_guidelines.pdf

EUREX
Excessive System Usage Fee:
https://www.eurexchange.com/blob/exchange-en/4060-649056/649034/2/data/er13212e.pdf
Order to Trade Ratio:
http://www.eurexgroup.com/blob/group-en/46532-649314/649312/2/data/er13213e.pdf

Today There Are SEFs: The Final Piece in a Pablo Picasso Abstract Rendition of Effective Swaps Regulation?

Today the world of Swap Execution Facilities has arrived, and the last material piece of Title VII is now in place amidst the complex mosaic of derivatives reform that began in the United States with the passage of Dodd Frank in 2010. In the words of CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler, “a paradigm shift” has occurred.

But when we step back and view the virtually completed mosaic of our new derivatives laws and regulations what do we have? Do we have a completed puzzle that matches the promised picture on the front of the box, or do we have something different, something that seems more like a Pablo Picasso abstract rendition?

Unfortunately, the first problem is that the arrival of SEFs comes today amidst the rubble of a shut down Federal government and a US Congress in total disarray, with most of the CFTC staff on temporary furlough. As a result, potential important relief requested by Michel Barnier, financial services commissioner for the European Union, to enable multilateral trade execution facilities based in Europe that might otherwise be required to register as SEFs to continue to do business with US persons for at least five months, was not granted, and perhaps could not be granted because of the absence of working CFTC personnel. This request apparently was not addressed before the CFTC closed its doors, despite a flurry of other guidance and no action relief that hastily was issued within the prior few days (often late at night) to accommodate today’s SEF roll-out.

However, a bigger issue with Dodd Frank is that it failed effectively to address a significant contributor to the problems of 2008 in any case: the pillared regulation of financial services in the US — even where relevant products are fungible and market participants are the same — particularly in connection with futures and securities. Yes, investment banks and ordinary banks failed and required bailouts because of a myriad of reasons that justified most of the laudatory objectives of Dodd Frank, but there was also substantial investment fraud that year too (as there has been since), that seems to have been caught in cracks caused by mostly uncoordinated US regulatory oversight of financial services. Let’s not forget that, during 2008, while FINRA reviewed the activities of Bernard Madoff’s broker dealer downstairs – which appeared fine – dramatic fraud was occurring upstairs within the walls of the affiliated investment adviser where only the SEC and the states had oversight. Then, shortly after Madoff’s house of cards collapsed, Allen Stanford’s corrupt practices were also ended in early 2009. And just a few years later, in 2011, MF Global, a combined broker dealer regulated by the SEC and futures commission merchant regulated by the CFTC, collapsed after misusing customer funds.

The response of Congress to all this — to a complex system of regulation that saw securities regulated by one Federal agency, the SEC (and individual states too); of futures by another, the CFTC; of options and certain hybrid securities and futures products both by the CFTC and/or the SEC; and over the counter derivatives by none — was to create in the US a third distinct Federal pillar of regulation for swaps, and bifurcate the responsibility for that regulation within the two existing pillars of the SEC and CFTC. (In fairness, Congress did establish the Financial Stability Oversight Council as an overseer of all US financial regulators, but it is not a primary regulator.)

Now, finally, after more than three years following the passage of Dodd Frank, and in the fifth year following the financial crisis of 2008, we finally have in place comprehensive oversight of what once were exclusively OTC derivatives — at least to the extent they fall within the jurisdiction of the CFTC — plus or minus a few exemptions and no action letters (by current count, more than 100).

And let’s not forget the many agitated non-US regulators who are rightfully dismayed by the efforts of the CFTC not only to regulate within its own borders, but extraterritorially too. The CFTC has justified this, relying on language in Title VII giving it authority where overseas activity has a “direct and significant impact” on activities or commerce in the United States but sometimes forgetting its equally mandatory obligation under Title VII to consult and coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities “…to promote [the] effective and consistent global regulation of swaps” too.

For all this work what precisely do we get: phased-in mandatory central clearing and execution on transparent, regulated platforms for the most liquid swaps, reporting of all swaps transactions; registration of big swaps’ traders; daily marking and margin calls; and differential capital requirements for dealers engaging in cleared or uncleared swaps transactions (except to the extent international financial regulators enact capital and liquidity standards that actually may penalize banks for engaging in cleared transactions). Moreover, we also obtained loose standards of fraud-based manipulation that authorize the CFTC to prosecute manipulation without showing intent or an effect on price, no matter where in the world such problems may occur (even if solely involving non-US persons), or even if the local non-US regulator is already on the case prosecuting the wrong-doers.

But let’s be frank (without Dodd): we probably could have gotten all this and more had Congress taken a simpler and more coherent route back in 2010 — namely (1) build upon the futures regulatory structure already embodied in existing law to regulate futures’ close cousin, swaps; and once and for all (2) collapse the CFTC and the SEC into one coherent financial services regulator of all futures, securities and swaps. Indeed, the current debate about futurization suggests that market forces likely will drive swaps and futures regulation to a common plain in any case, but only after much pain and financial expenditure.

However, the same gridlock deriving from the same indifference to holistic solutions that we see played out on the front pages of our newspapers today in connection with far bigger issues, played out in 2010, and instead of enacting something simpler yet more dramatic and comprehensive, our elected representatives adopted legislation drowned in minutiae that has now taken countless hours by both government and private sector employees to implement, let alone even understand — with even more regulations (and guidance and no action letters) to come. And to think the alternative might have been far less expensive to implement too, saving taxpayer dollars now and in the future.

But today, we have SEFs – which hopefully will be the final material puzzle piece to help accomplish all the goals envisioned by Title VII. But could we have accomplished these goals more coherently and even faster with less dislocation and anguish, obtaining a completed puzzle more like the picture on the box? We will never know for sure, but we can speculate (provided not in a high frequency kind of way).

Gary DeWaal’s Bridging the Week: September 23 to 27 and 30, 2013

Last week, brokers once again learned through enforcement actions against ICAP Europe that failure to maintain a robust supervisory system over their employees can be costly and embarrassing. However, brokers also learned in a NY court decision involving Amaranth Advisors, that the threshold to hold futures commission merchants liable for their clients’ possible manipulative practices is very very high.

This week swap dealers and other users of swaps will learn whether the decision of the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission to force trading of certain swaps by US persons onto registered Swap Execution Facilities on October 2 promotes transparency and liquidity, engenders anger and confusion, results in a bit of both, or ends up being postponed at least in part. And, who can keep up with all the last minute flurry of guidance and no action letters?

These and other matters covered this week on Bridging the Week are:

  • Yet another trader was sued by the CFTC after allegedly causing large losses to his employer following efforts to disguise trading losses by making false entries into his employer’s internal bookkeeping system;
  • Industry organizations and participants continued to fight against proposed mandatory top up to customer funds’ requirements and a proposed BIS leverage ratio framework that could materially hurt FCMs and their customers;
  • ESMA considers the application of its rules to transactions between non-EU entities; it will make a proposal to the European Commission by November 15;
  • FINRA offered guidance to Broker Dealers regarding suitability while NFA offered guidance to Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors regarding disclosures;
  • Vision Financial Markets, a US-based FCM, was fined in two separate CFTC actions, one for segregation violations, and one for failure to supervise (in connections with positions limits monitoring);
  • RJ O’Brien, also a US-based FCM, was fined too by the CFTC related to a one day segregation violation; and more.

Here’s a video summary of this week’s top developments:

 

 

And here are the details (with Valuable Lessons Learned):

CFTC and UK FCA Sue and Settle with ICAP Europe; Three Non-US Individuals Indicted by the US Department of Justice

As widely reported elsewhere, ICAP Europe Limited was sued by and settled with the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the UK Financial Conduct Authority related to the actions of three of its non-US based employees who endeavored to manipulate the Yen London Interbank Offered Rate (Yen LIBOR) from at least October 2006 through January 2011. The three employees also were charged by the US Department of Justice with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and wire fraud in connection with their conduct.

In settling these matters, ICAP agreed to pay a fine of US$ 65 Million to the CFTC and a fine of GB £14 Million (US$ 22.4 Million). ICAP also agreed with the CFTC to augment its internal controls by (1) strengthening certain compliance procedures, (2) routinely reviewing certain electronic and audio communications, (3) placing compliance personnel among certain brokers, (4) enhancing certain monitoring and electronic exception reporting systems, (5) requiring recording and retaining of recordings of certain communications for at least one year, (6) enhancing internal training, and (7) using third party auditors to conduct annual audits for at least four years of certain broker desks, among other matters.

Each of the non-US employees of ICAP faces a maximum penalty of 30 years in prison for each count charged if convicted.

Essentially, two of the ICAP employees charged by the DOJ are alleged to have encouraged a third ICAP employee to provide false information to third party banks regarding Yen borrowing rates. This false information was then used by the banks in a process that led to the worldwide dissemination each business day of Yen Libor fixing rates that benefited a third party client of ICAP (in large part UBS AG – which previously settled FCA and CFTC enforcement actions too regarding this matter), and did not reflect the banks’ true assessment of borrowing rates. The evidence against the employees (and included by the CFTC, FCA, and DOJ in their enforcement actions) included much colorful electronic communication that contained explicit references to the alleged manipulative scheme.

The FCA and CFTC cited a breakdown in supervision at ICAP as the cause of the Firm’s problems. According to the CFTC,

“ICAP’s ineffectual supervision of the Yen derivatives and cash desks, its misplaced reliance on the expectation that Yen desk heads would enforce a compliance regime on their desk colleagues, and its failure to audit the Yen derivatives desk or adequately review the Yen brokers’ communications with clients, among other internal controls and supervisory deficiencies, allowed this misconduct to continue for years.”

Although all the actors and nefarious conduct involved in this matter were situated outside the USA, the CFTC asserted jurisdiction saying that the three employee’s conduct to influence the Yen LIBOR rate “…affect[ed] or tend[ed] to affect the prices of commodities in interstate commerce, including the daily rates at which Yen LIBOR is fixed.” ICAP was held liable for the acts of its employees and managers who engaged in wrongful conduct.

In connection with the FCA matter, ICAP was charged with failing (1) to observe proper standards of market conduct, and (2) to take reasonable care to “organize and control its affairs responsibly” and to maintain adequate risk management systems.

In commenting upon his Firm’s settlements, ICAP Group CEO Michael Spencer said, “We have learned from this, we will further improve our risk and compliance systems and we will continue to provide our clients with the highly professional service that they expect across many markets and geographies.”

A costly lesson hopefully learned once again is that inadequate internal controls, especially involving poor supervision of employees, coupled with arrogant employees who value compensation above all else, can hurt a firm economically – both in substantial fines by regulators and litigation expense, as well as loss of business due to impaired reputation and distraction of internal staff who must deal potentially with both government investigations and litigation. However, does the authority of the US regulators know no bounds? In these days of severely limited government resources is it an efficient use of resources for US regulators to pursue an overseas incident involving solely overseas-based persons already prosecuted by the local regulator?

Valuable Lessons Learned: Requiring Desk Heads and Front Office supervisors to participate in the oversight of their Front Office subordinates is a good practice. However, this should not be in lieu of Compliance’s and other control functions’ routine monitoring and periodic formal review of such subordinates, as well as of the managers, too; compliance should never be entrusted solely to Front Office personnel. Determining the appropriate amount of Compliance and other control function resources to dedicate to routine monitoring and periodic review should be done using a risk-based analysis, especially reviewing desks that have a high proportion of their business involving just a few customers (let alone just one) or seem to have customers subject to a high incidence of regulatory requests. Review the specific commitments of ICAP Europe to the CFTC and assess whether any measures might be appropriate to be adopted by your firm too.

Amaranth Litigation: Standards for Aiding and Abetting Violations by Brokers for Clients Are Very Rigorous

In an important decision in the Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litigation, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Court in NY ruled that the requirements to demonstrate successfully that a futures commission merchant is responsible for a client’s manipulative activities are quite rigorous.

Specifically, in this matter Amaranth Advisors LLC was sued by a class of traders who claimed that the company had manipulated the price of natural gas futures during 2006, and that its clearing broker, JP Morgan Futures, Inc., a CFTC registered FCM, had aided and abetted Amaranth’s manipulation. A lower court previously rejected the traders’ initial and subsequently amended claim against JPM.

The traders had argued that JPM was liable for Amaranth’s manipulation, because as its clearing broker, JPM was aware of Amaranth’s positions and trading activity including the fact that Amaranth violated New York Mercantile Exchange natural gas position limits and exceeded the Exchange’s accountability levels at various times. The traders also alleged that JPM knew that Amaranth engaged in “slamming the close” activities (an indicia of manipulative activity), as well as of a NYMEX and CFTC investigation into Amaranth’s trading.

In upholding the lower court’s rejection of the traders’ claim, the Circuit Court held that to establish aiding and abetting there must be proof of an unlawful intent to further the underlying violations. In the words of a former judge, aiding and abetting requires the defendants “…in some sort [to] associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed.”

Here claims the Court, JPM solely provided routine clearing services. Although JPM may have known about Amaranth’s large positions, large positions in and of themselves do not imply manipulation. This is even when such large positions violated applicable position or accountability levels as the goals of such limits are not just to preclude manipulation, but also to ameliorate excessive speculation, to ensure effective price discovery of markets, and to ensure sufficient liquidity for hedgers.

Likewise even where JPM was aware of Amaranth’s slamming the close activities and could not provide any “legitimate economic reason” why Amaranth would engage in such conduct, such knowledge by itself was not sufficient to satisfy an aiding and abetting charge. Although slamming the close may suggest manipulative conduct, it is not dispositive, says the Court.

According to the Court,

“It suffices to conclude that in the circumstances presented here, the provision of routine clearing services, when combined only with allegations that the clearing firm knew of trading activity that was highly suggestive but not dispositive of manipulation, is not enough to state a claim for aiding and abetting under [the Commodity Exchange Act].”

Valuable Lessons Learned: This decision is an important and favorable decision for FCMs. However, FCMs should still be investing in monitoring systems to help detect potential trade practice and speculative limit violations by their customers, and have appropriate personnel to review the output of such systems and act on at least some criteria of exceptions.

SEFs Go Live October 2: Chilton and O’Malia Recommend Delay; A Flurry of Guidance and No Action Letters Is Released September 25-27

Despite wide-spread public expressions of concern, including from at least two CFTC Commissioners, Bart Chilton and Scott O’Malia, the CFTC seems determined to go forward with the October 2 go live date for Swap Execution Facilities. As of September 27, 17 SEFs were approved for trading and two SEFs applications were pending.

As of October 2 all multiple to multiple swap trading venues must register as SEFs if they facilitate transactions on behalf of US persons, even if they only offer products that, as of that date, are not subject to a trade execution mandate – the so-called “Footnote 88” issue. Single dealer platforms not offering products subject to the trade execution mandate are not required to register as SEFs by October 2.

Among the concerns regarding the go live date for SEFs is that such requirement may cause serious issues for European-based multilateral trading facilities that accommodate US persons. According to Commissioner O’Malia:

“…the Commission is facing serious problems regarding its treatment of EU-regulated multilateral trading facilities (“MTFs”). In the Barnier-Gensler “Path Forward” document, the Commission assured European regulators that it will extend appropriate time-limited transitional relief to certain EU-regulated MTFs, in the event that the Commission’s trade execution requirement is triggered before March 15, 2014. However, the flexibility embodied in this agreement appears to be in direct contradiction to the SEF final rules that expressly require all platforms meeting a SEF definition to register by October 2, or cease operation. I don’t think the current registration requirement on October 2is consistent with either the spirit or the letter of the “Path Forward” document. It is unclear to me what the impact on liquidity will be if as a result of this problem, all U.S. persons are required to trade exclusively on U.S. SEF platforms or else to be forced to revert to bilateral trading.”

In suggesting a two month delay for the reporting rules related to the October 2 go live date, Commissioner Chilton cited technological and other impracticalities. According to Commissioner Chilton:

“We have heard from many quarters that, absent providing some relief, we are at risk of causing serious market disruptions and possible serious liquidity crises. At this particular time, given the possibility of a federal government shut-down, it is simply not reasonable to turn a deaf ear to these requests. Let’s be reasonable.”

In anticipation of this go-live date, CFTC staff issued guidance on September 26 regarding swaps straight-through processing. Among other things, staff provided its view that (1) a clearing FCM cannot reject a trade executed on a SEF that previously passed its pre-execution risk-based limits while an order; (2) Designated Clearing Organizations must accept or reject trades executed on a SEF or Designated Contract Market (for which the SEF or DCM has established processes for clearing) as soon as technologically practical which is now regarded as within 10 seconds (previously this was 60 seconds); and (3) any trade executed on a SEF or designated contract market that is not accepted for clearing should be regarded as void. As a result, FCMs, Swap Dealers, SEFs and DCMs should not require breakage agreements as a condition for access to trading on a SEF or DCM.

In addition, during the evening on September 27, the CFTC’s Division of Market Oversight (DMO) issued a flurry of limited no action relief to facilitate the October 2 go live date. In one letter, DMO extended the date on which SEFs must make real time reports of swaps transactions and pricing data to Swap Data Repositories (SDR). This relief expires at 12:01 AM eastern time on October 30, 2013, for swaps in the FX asset class, and 12:01 AM eastern time on December 2, 2013, for swaps executed in equity and commodity asset classes. In another letter, DMO provided temporary relief to reporting counterparties to uncleared swaps transactions executed initially on a SEF for errors or omissions in swap continuation data reported to an SDR to the extent such errors or omissions were caused by incomplete information provided by a SEF. This relief expires no later than October 29, 2013, for swaps executed in the FX asset class, and December 1, 2013 for swaps executed in the equity and commodity asset classes. And finally, DMO provided temporary relief to SEFs temporarily registered by October 2 from fulfilling certain of their enforcement responsibilities with regard to activities of market participants who trade on or through such SEFs; this relief expires November 1, 2013. A myriad of conditions apply to all participants desiring to take advantage of the offered relief.

Is this really the most effective way to roll out a significant new regulatory requirement?

Briefly:

CFTC Sues Yet Another Trader For Hiding His Trading Losses: Late on Friday afternoon, the CFTC filed an enforcement action against John Aaron Brooks related to his alleged efforts to hide trading losses from his employer, an affiliate of an unnamed “large NY-based commercial bank,” from November 2010 through October 2011. As a result of his activities, the CFTC alleges that the affiliate sustained US$ 40 Million in losses.

According to the CFTC, Mr. Brook’s committed his fraud by manually entering false values for CBOT-traded ethanol futures into the bank’s computer system. The CFTC charged Mr. Brooks with violations of the anti-fraud and new fraud-based manipulation sections of the Commodity Exchange Act and related regulations.

Hopefully by now, firms are prohibiting their traders from manually entering their own trades into internal bookkeeping systems.

CME to Allow Excess LSOC Collateral Value to Cover Variation Margin Losses: Effective October 21, 2013, CME will permit clearing firms that offer their cleared swaps customers LSOC “with-excess” to use a client’s excess LSOC value to cover its variation loss to the extent the customer’s required cash on deposit is in the currency for which the variation loss occurs. LSOC refers to Legal Segregation with Operational Commingling and is a mandatory segregation practice by FCMs for cleared-swaps customers that is aimed to reduce fellow customer risk and to expedite the porting of swaps positions and collateral in the event of an FCM default. The use of this CME LSOC enhancement will be optional.

Industry Organizations and Participants Continue to Fight Against Proposed CFTC Segregation and BIS Leverage Ratio Frameworks that Could Materially Hurt FCMs. The week before last a large group of organizations representing a wide cross section of the agricultural futures market (Ag Group Consortium) filed a letter with the CFTC arguing against the CFTC’s November 2012 proposals to require FCMs to maintain an amount of their own funds in their customer segregated accounts 24/7 at least equal to the amount of their customers’ aggregate deficit balances. According the Ag Group Consortium, this proposal, if adopted, most likely will require customers to pre-margin hedge accounts, discourage farmers from using futures markets to manage their risks, and expose farmers more to FCMs — “the last thing customers want to do now, in the wake of MF Global and Peregrine Financial Group.” This past week, a bipartisan group of senior legislators from both Senate and House CFTC oversight committees wrote a letter to the CFTC echoing these sentiments and reminding the Commission that “[t]he goal of increasing futures customer protections should be to strengthen the markets without harming the ability of American farmers, ranchers, and end-users to hedge their legitimate business risks.”

Separately, the week before last, a consortium of industry organizations, including GFMA, SIFMA, ISDA, and the Financial Services Roundtable filed one letter, and the Futures Industry Association another, that cautioned the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision from adopting rules that might penalize banks that have FCM subsidiaries that engage in cleared swaps, futures or options business for their customers. The proposed rules might do this by requiring banks to take leverage capital charges for the exposure BIS posits FCMs have to clearing houses on the one side, and customers, on the other, in connection with each cleared customer swap, futures or options transaction. In other words, BIS proposes to deconstruct what FCMs consider to be agency transactions on behalf of their customers into two separate principal-like transactions for capital computation purposes. However, the proposal seems to ignore that FCMs should have no liability to their customers if a clearinghouse fails, and that customers post margin to offset their exposure to FCMs. According to FIA, the proposed leverage capital charges,

“…will make client clearing economically unviable for clearing member banks and prohibitively expensive for end users. These high capital charges will be passed down to customers in the form of fees. Where derivatives must be cleared through CCPs (such as swaps in the United States), end-users may elect not to hedge with these derivatives at all rather than pay the high fees associated with client clearing. Where derivatives are not mandated to be cleared through CCPs, end-users may elect to engage in bilateral, uncleared trades. All of these consequences would make the market less, rather than more, safe.”

When will regulators step back and think about regulation holistically? If the goal is to lessen customers’ exposure to their brokers, why propose regulations potentially to increase their exposure (reversing decades of law interpretation to do so)? If the goal is to promote central clearing why propose regulations to discourage central clearing?

Help to Broker Dealers (Regarding Suitability Assessments) and CPOs and CTAs (Regarding Disclosures): The US Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) issued a Regulatory Notice setting forth observations and recommendations regarding firms’ compliance with its new suitability rule (2111; keep in mind, that for broker dealers suitability assessments are required for institutional customers in addition to retail customers unless certain criteria are satisfied). Separately, the National Futures Association issued a revised guide for Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors in connection with their preparation of disclosure documents, to reflect changes in CFTC rules that became effective during August 2013.

More Madoff Fallout: SEC Charges Madoff Accountant for Role in Creating False Books and Records: The SEC charged Paul Konigsberg with creating false books and records in connection with Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. These books and records, including inaccurate trade confirmations, were alleged to have been used to help defraud many of Madoff’s oldest and wealthiest clients. The US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of NY filed criminal charges against Mr. Konigsberg too related to this matter. The SEC seeks return of ill-gotten gains, penalties and an injunction. In connection with his criminal matter, Mr. Konigsberg faces up to 40 years in prison in addition to fines and disgorgement requirements.

Just Like the CFTC, ESMA is Considering the Application of its Rules to Transactions between non-EU entities: The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) had been scheduled to submit to the European Commission by September 25, 2013, its proposed technical standards related to the application of EMIR – the European equivalent of Title VII of Dodd Frank – to transactions between non-EU entities with a direct, substantial and foreseeable effect within the EU. The new deadline is November 15, 2013.

When a Regulator Announces it Will Not Bring an Enforcement Action, That’s News; CFTC Ceases 2008 Silver Markets’ Investigation: The CFTC announced this week that it will not bring an enforcement action related to alleged manipulation of the silver markets in 2008 that its Division of Enforcement began investigating that year. The CFTC commenced its investigation (and publicly confirmed it) after receiving complaints regarding silver prices. The CFTC made its decision not to bring any charges, after spending more than 7,000 enforcement staff hours and reviewing market fundamentals and trading between cash, futures and over the counter markets.

In an interview on RT America on November 13, 2012, Commissioner Bart Chilton said that he believed there had been “nefarious actions” and “violations of the law” in connection with silver trading during the relevant time.

You Think You Had a Bad Week?: Vision Financial Markets Fined in Two Separate CFTC Actions, One for Segregation Violations, One for Failure to Supervise: Vision Financial Markets LLC — a US-based FCM (and also a broker dealer registered with the US SEC) — was the subject of not one, but two enforcement actions by the CFTC last week, both of which it settled for an aggregate of US$ 665,000. In the first matter, Vision was charged by the CFTC with failure to supervise because of its failure to aggregate multiple accounts of a customer in order to assess whether the customer was violating Chicago Mercantile Exchange speculative position limits. Apparently Vision relied on faulty software in making its error. After Vision discovered the error in July 2012, the error was not corrected until January 2013.

In the second matter, Vision was charged by the CFTC with failing to segregate properly its customer funds from August 2008 through May 2009. In this matter, Vision purchased securities with customer funds, but commingled these securities with its own funds in a single account at the Depository Trust Company. After Vision was alerted to this issue following a routine examination by the CME, it recalculated its customers’ segregated funds and learned that it had been under-segregated from December 2008 through May 2009. Prior to the CME audit, Vision did not report it was under segregated either to the CFTC or CME. Vision was charged both for being under segregated and failing to notify the CFTC and CME that it was under segregated.

Vision’s segregation issues did not result in any loss to any customer.

How do you report something you are not aware of?

RJO O’Brien Also Fined for a Segregation Violation: R.J. O’Brien & Associates — a US-based FCM — also was sued and settled with the CFTC for payment of a US$ 125,000 fine related to a violation of the CFTC’s segregation rules related to customer funds in support of the trading of non-US futures and options. In this matter, RJO carried an account for another FCM (non-clearing FCM), and on one day in February 2012 transferred funds from the non-clearing FCM’s secured foreign futures and options customer omnibus account to reduce a margin deficiency in the non-clearing FCM’s segregated domestic futures and options omnibus account. This transfer was made without calling the non-clearing FCM for margin or advising the non-clearing FCM it was making the transfer. The transfer caused the non-clearing FCM to have insufficient funds to meet its obligation to its own foreign futures and options customers.

RJO’s segregation issue did not result in any loss to any customer.

Valuable Lessons Learned: Post MF Global, the CFTC appears to have a zero tolerance for any violation of law or rule related to the handling of customers funds — even if the violation is for a very short duration and never harmed any customer. As a result, FCMs must consider whether there are any double checks or “four eyes” approaches that will help reduce the possibility of any error in the handling of customer funds going undetected. At a minimum, the handling of customer funds should be at least annually reviewed by Internal Audit, absent good cause.

What do each of these matters mean practically for your business? For questions or assistance, do not hesitate to contact Gary DeWaal and Associates at (212) 382-4615 or at: [email protected].

For more background, see:

In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litigation:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ca2-12-02075/pdf/USCOURTS-ca2-12-02075-0.pdf

Basel III Proposed Leverage Ratio Framework

Consultative Document:
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs251.pdf
Industry Responses:
FIA:
http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/FIA-Leverage_Ratio_Comment_Letter_092013.pdf
GFMA et al:
http://www.gfma.org/correspondence/item.aspx?id=536

CFTC v. John Aaron Brooks:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfbrookscomplaint092713.pdf

CFTC Proposed Enhancements to Customer Protection

CFTC Proposal:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2012-26435a.pdf
Agricultural Consortium Letter:
https://www.cotton.org/issues/2013/cftclet.cfm
Congressional Letter:
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=59348&SearchText=

CFTC v. R.J. O’Brien and Associates:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfobrienorder092713.pdf

CFTC: SEFs Go Live October 2

Staff Guidance on Swaps Straight-Through Processing:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/stpguidance.pdf
DMO No Action Letter on SEF Reporting:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/13-55.pdf
DMO No Action Letter regarding Continuation Data Reporting:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/13-56.pdf
DMO No Action Letter regarding SEF Enforcement Responsibilities:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/13-57.pdf
Statement of Commissioner Chilton regarding the October 2 Go Live Date:

http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/chiltonstatement092713
Statement of Commissioner O’Malia regarding the October 2 Go Live Date:
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaomalia-29

CFTC Silver Markets Investigation:

Announcement of Closure of Investigation:
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6709-13
Bart Chilton 2012 RT America Interview:
http://rt.com/shows/capital-account/bart-chilton-regulations-global/

ESMA Revised Delivery Date on Cross Border Application of EMIR:
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/gallaae_2013.09.16_14.41.39_5c4n7472_1.pdf

FINRA: Suitability Guidance:
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p351220.pdf

ICAP Enforcement Actions:

CFTC:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enficaporder092513.pdf
Department of Justice:
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/838201392583237891746.pdf
FCA:
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/icap-europe-limited.pdf
ICAP Statement:
http://www.icap.com/news-events/in-the-news/news/2013/130925-icap-europe-ltd-reaches-settlements-with-fca-and-cftc.aspx

CME Excess LSOC Proposal (search for Advisory 13-440):
http://www.cmegroup.com/tools-information/advisorySearch.html

Madoff – Actions involving Paul Konigsberg

SEC civil action:
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2013/comp-pr2013-202.pdf
US Attorney’s Office criminal action:
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/September13/PaulKonigsbergArrestPR/Konigsberg,%20Paul%20S11%20Indictment.pdf

National Futures Association: Disclosure Document Guide to CPOs and CTAs:
http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-compliance/publication-library/disclosure-document-guide.pdf

Vision Financial Markets Actions:

CFTC action re: segregation:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfvisionorder092713.pdf
CFTC action re: failure to supervise (position limits):
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfvisionorder092413.pdf

The information contained in this article is not legal advice. For legal advice, please consult with your attorney. The information in this article is derived from sources believed to be reliable as of September 26, 2013, but no representation or warranty is made regarding the accuracy of any statement. To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by U.S. Treasury Regulations, Gary DeWaal and Associates LLC informs you that any U.S. tax advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) was not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein. Gary DeWaal and Associates may represent one or more entities mentioned in this article.

 

Gary DeWaal’s Bridging the Week: September 16 to 20 and 23, 2013

During the week of September 16 to 20, 2013, the biggest news was the coordinated enforcement actions by four international regulators against JP Morgan related to its London Whale incident. But what also was big news was that the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission was not among the regulators joining in this coordinated enforcement action — for now. Why?

However, the JP Morgan matter was just the tip of the iceberg in a very hectic week featuring many interesting US litigation developments, new regulatory requirements, regulatory proposals, and an important speech by the CEO of the UK Financial Conduct Authority — all potentially impacting a wide-range of industry participants worldwide. These matters – all covered in this week’s Bridging the Week – include:

  • four regulators sued JP Morgan; why was the CFTC not the fifth;
  • DRW Investments sued the US CFTC to avoid a possible enforcement action;
  • an amended complaint was filed by MF Global Holdings litigation trustee against John Corzine and other principals;
  • the US SEC charged 23 firms (many from the managed money industry) in connection with unlawful short sales related to initial public offerings; simultaneously the SEC issued a Risk Alert;
  • the US CFTC seeks public comment on CME’s proposed new EFRP rules (including banning transitory EFRPs);
  • IBs’, FCMs’, RFEDs’ and certain CTAs’ taping requirement becomes effective December 21;
  • ICE Clear US will require a greater percentage (50%) of clearing member guaranty fund deposit in cash, effective December 31;
  • UK FCA CEO Martin Wheatley gave his view on derivatives’ cross border regulation at last week’s London ISDA conference: why can’t we all just get along (internationally);
  • CTAs’ first quarterly report is due at NFA November 14; and more.

 

 

Four Regulators Sue JP Morgan; Why Was the CFTC Not the Fifth?

Last week JP Morgan consented to and was assessed fines by four international regulators totaling US$ 920 Million related to what has been colloquially referred to as the “London Whale” trades during 2012.These trades caused the Bank to suffer losses of US$ 6.2 Billion. The four regulators were the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK (GB£ 137,610,000 (US$ 220 Million); the US Federal Reserve Bank (US$ 200 Million); the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (US$ 300 Million), and the US Securities and Exchange Commission (US$ 200 Million).

According to a Form 8-K filed by the Bank with the SEC on September 19, apparently three regulator investigations related to this matter continue, ones conducted by Massachusetts Securities Division, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the US Department of Justice. The Bank has disclosed, in fact, that the CFTC has provided a so-called “Wells” notice to it notifying the Bank that the Commission staff intends to recommend an enforcement action related to the London Whale incident. JP Morgan has indicated that it will respond to the CFTC’s notice in due course.

Previously, the US Attorney for the Southern District of NY filed criminal charges, and the Securities and Exchange Commission filed civil charges against two JP Morgan employees — Julien Grout, and his supervisor, Javier Martin-Artajo — for over-valuing certain trading positions they initiated to hide the trading losses that are at the heart of the London Whale incident.

The facts of the London Whale incident are relatively well known by now, and both the FCA’s and the SEC’s settlement orders provide detailed insight into the breakdown of internal controls at JP Morgan that gave rise to the Firm’s issues as well as the delay in uncovering the Firm’s issues.

Another article on this website provides my detailed analysis of lessons learned from this matter, as well as my caution regarding the CFTC’s expansive new anti-manipulation authority post Dodd Frank. Check it out at:
http://www.garydewaalandassociates.com/my-view-reflections-on-the-jp-morgan-settlements-human-nature-internal-controls-and-the-cftcs-broad-new-anti-manipulation-authority/

Valuable Lessons Learned: I don’t think it’s uncommon for firms to underestimate, initially, the potential seriousness of problems. This is why it is critical that the employees (or their direct supervisors) potentially responsible for a problem not to be the persons entrusted to investigate the problem. Surely such employees need to be questioned and even, perhaps consulted, but where there are potentially material issues, it is important for senior management to obtain a view of the potential problem and other analyses from impartial persons. Similarly, allowing traders to mark their own trading positions or input their own trades into internal systems must be avoided.

DRW Investments Sues the CFTC to Avoid a Possible Enforcement Action

DRW Investments, a Chicago-based proprietary trading firm, and its principal, Don Wilson, filed a complaint in federal court in Chicago seeking to prevent the Commodity Futures Trading Commission from filing an enforcement action against them for unlawful manipulation related to certain orders they placed during January through August 2011.

The relevant orders involved interest rate swap (IRS) futures contracts cleared by the International Derivatives Clearinghouse (IDCH). This matter arises, according to the complaint, following a CFTC investigation into these orders, and notice to plaintiffs that an enforcement action is imminent.

During the relevant time, DRW placed orders for IRS futures contracts both through a voice broker and through IDCH’s electronic trading platform; these orders were for different prices than prices prevailing for over the counter IRS transactions. “This was because,” says the Complaint, “DRW believed, based on its analysis of the economic difference between the two derivatives, that the IDCH Contracts should be trading a different price than those of the comparable uncleared OTC swap.” IDCH apparently based its daily settlement prices, during the relevant time, on DRW’s electronic orders. The Complaint suggests that the basis for the CFTC’s complaint against it will be the CFTC’s belief that DRW’s orders were placed purposely to affect the settlement price “at something other than a fair and reasonable value.”

The Complaint argues that the “CFTC’s theory of liability depends upon a novel and legally untenable claim,” and that the matter “…is ripe for adjudication because the filing and pendency of an enforcement action…would subject DRW to hardship and cause it immediate and irreparable harm.”

Amended Complaint filed by MF Global Holdings Litigation Trustee against John Corzine and Other Principals

Less than a week after both John Corzine and Edith O’Brien filed on September 10, 2013, motions to dismiss the CFTC enforcement actions against them related to the MF Global collapse and misuse of customer funds in October 2011, the Litigation Trustee for MF Global Holdings (Holdings) filed an amended complaint naming John Corzine, Bradley Abelow, and Henri Steenkamp. According to the Trustee, the defendants’ design and implementation of highly leveraged transactions in foreign debt to enhance the Firm’s “apparent profitability” constituted breaches of their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. For this, the Trustee seeks an unspecified amount of damages against the defendants.

(Mr. Corzine was the former Chairman and CEO of Holdings and CEO of MF Global Inc. (MFGI; formerly registered as a futures commission merchant with the CFTC), Mr. Abelow, the President of Holdings at the time of its collapse and previously its Chief Operating Officer since September 2010, and Mr. Steenkamp, Holding’s Chief Financial Officer at the time of the Firm’s collapse, and previously Group Controller and Chief Account Officer.)

The defendants’ decision to invest specifically in European sovereign debt instruments, shortly after Mr. Corzine joined the Firm in 2010, ultimately led to the Firm’s collapse and MFGI’s misuse of customer funds, argues the Trustee. According to the amended complaint:

“Defendants embarked on their scheme without informing themselves (or the Board) of the true risks and without adequate processes and controls despite the fact that, throughout their tenures, they were repeatedly warned by internal auditors, risk managers and outside consultants that the [Firm]’s systems, controls and procedures were inadequate.

In his Memorandum of Law in support of his Motion to dismiss the CFTC’s enforcement action against him filed the on September 10, Mr. Corzine acknowledged that he recommended “strategic investments,” including in European sovereign debt, but that “[t]he risks attendant to the [investment] strategy were at all times disclosed to and approved by the Board of Directors of [Holdings], and that “[a]t no point in time was Mr. Corzine made aware of any failure in MFGI’s systems and controls that were designed to protect customer funds.”

The Amended Complaint by the Litigation Trustee was filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court in New York City, while Mr. Corzine’s and Ms. Obrien’s Motions to Dismiss were filed in the United States District Court in New York City.

US SEC Charges 23 Firms in Connection with Unlawful Short Sales related to Initial Public Offerings; Simultaneously Issues a Risk Alert

The US Securities and Exchange Commission commenced and settled enforcement actions against 22 firms, alleging that they unlawfully engaged in short sales, within a restricted period — generally five days before a public offering — and then purchased the relevant securities during the public offering. This conduct is prohibited by SEC Rule 105 of its Regulation M. An additional firm was sued by the SEC for this conduct, but did not settle.

The 22 firms represent a cross section of the managed money industry, a pension plan administrator, and a non-US based firm, among others.

In connection with these matters, the 22 settling firms paid US $14.4 Million in fines and disgorgement of profits.

Simultaneously, the SEC issued a Risk Alert reminding investment advisers, investment companies and broker dealers to ensure they have adopted and implemented robust controls to ensure compliance with Rule 105 that prohibit purchases of securities in follow-on and secondary offerings when the purchaser engaged in short sales of the same securities during specified time periods before the pricing of the offering. Intent is not required for a Rule 105 violation. There are some limited exceptions to the prohibitions under Rule 105, however.

US CFTC and US NFA Sue and Simultaneously Settle with a Retail Foreign Exchange Dealer for Practices that Amount to “Heads I Win, Tails I Win Too” Practices

Both the US CFTC and US NFA sued and settled with FXDirectDealer LLC, a NY-based retail foreign exchange dealer and futures commission merchant related to the Firm’s customer order entry system that, after a customer placed an order, in the case of an interim price move (i.e., slippage), rounded off the transaction in a way that routinely benefited the Firm and not the customer. Previously, NFA had charged the Firm with violations of its anti-money laundering requirements; this complaint was settled too.

The CFTC charged FXDirectDealer with failure to supervise and required the Firm to reimburse impacted customers US$ 1.83 Million and pay a fine of US$ 914,121, while NFA also required the Firm to reimburse impacted customers related to the FX slippage offense, and pay an additional fine of US$ 1.1 Million in connection with both offenses.

And briefly:

  • CME and EFRPs (Encore): The CFTC formally requested public comment by close of business October 18 regarding the CME’s proposal to prohibit all transitory exchange of futures for related products and to amend certain recordkeeping and compliance obligations relating to non-transitory EFRPs. These proposed rules were described on this website last week. For more, see last week’s Bridging the Week at:
    http://www.garydewaalandassociates.com/gary-dewaals-bridging-the-week-september-9-to-13-and-16-2013/.
  • CFTC Registered IBs’, FCMs’, RFEDs’ and Certain CTAs’ Taping Requirement Effective December 21: The NFA issued a reminder of new CFTC books and records requirements that become effective for US Futures Commission Merchants, Introducing Brokers and Registered Foreign Exchange Dealers on December 21, 2013, that generally require recording and retention of recordings for at least one year of all oral communications provided or received related to orders or solicitation of orders leading to the execution of a commodity interest (e.g., futures or swaps trade) and related cash or forward transaction whether it occurs on a firm-provided or personal telephone or other digital or electronic media device (these requirements also apply to Commodity Trading Advisors that are members of Designated Contract Markets or Swap Execution Facilities). There are exceptions for Introducing Brokers that generate US$ 5 Million or less in aggregate gross revenues in total over the preceding three years and an invitation to apply for no action relief to everyone if implementation if recording is technologically or economically impractical.

Valuable Lessons Learned: Firms now should be amending their policies and procedures, as well as investigating and obtaining technology that will permit them to comply with this taping requirement — particularly in connection with mobile telephones and other means of electronic communication (e.g., Skype). It probably is not sufficient solely to prohibit all communication with clients on company-issued cell phones, because it is likely to happen on private cell phones instead without taping, and in such case, not only will requisite conversations likely not be taped (despite the requirement), but there will be no company records of any kind related to such conversations, unless by happenstance. Because of this, firms should consider, as part of their policies and procedures, to require all employees to certify at least annually that they did not have relevant communications with customers on un-taped personal cell phones, or by other digital or electronic means.

  • More Clearing Member Guaranty Fund in Cash: ICE Clear US advised clearing members that, effective December 31, 2013, all guaranty deposits must be met 50% in cash, an increase from its current requirement of $50,000.
  • Didn’t Mom Say Don’t Lie: Both the CFTC and SEC brought cases last week against respondents who lied to the agencies during investigations while under oath. In the CFTC case, In the Matter of Susan Butterfield, the respondent simultaneously settled her complaint by agreeing to pay a fine of US$ 50,000 for saying she never pre-stamped order tickets when previously she expressly had advised her supervisor that she engaged in such conduct (and also subsequently to the CFTC). In the SEC case, SEC v. Fredrick D. Scott, the respondent was sued for defrauding investors as well as making false statements to SEC examiners.
  • Martin Wheatley -Why Can’t We All Get Along (Internationally): In a wide ranging speech delivered to last week’s ISDA conference in London, Martin Wheatley, CEO of the UK FCA questioned the wisdom of individual jurisdictions endeavoring to regulate all derivatives activity with any link to themselves. Particularly in light of the October 2 go-live date for Swap Execution Facilities in the United States, he urged urgent adoption of a mutual recognition regime where there is equivalence of regulations. According to Mr. Wheatley, [U]ntil nations agree on more than they disagree you will create opportunities for regulatory arbitrage – a ‘race to the bottom’ if you like — that inevitably colours the way we look at issues like CCP margin requirements between the EU and US.”
  • CTAs’ First Quarterly Report Due November 14: This year, Commodity Trading Advisors s were required to file an annual report on Form PR providing general information about their trading programs, pool assets they direct; and the identity of Commodity Pool Operators of such pools. The NFA proposed to have CTAs file these reports also on a quarterly basis and this proposal was approved by the CFTC on March 30. In connection with this, the first quarterly report by CTAs for the quarter ending September 30, 2013, is due to be filed with the NFA on quarterly Form PR by November 14, 2013. The new form consists of the annual CFTC Form PR as well as additional questions related to certain trading programs offered by the CTA and amount of assets and monthly rates of return in connection with such programs. Both the CFTC and NFA filings are made through the NFA’s EasyFile system.
  • Compensation Secrets No More: This past week the SEC proposed a rule requiring public companies to disclose the ratio of the compensation of its chief executive officer to the median compensation of its employees. This proposed rule was required by Dodd Frank. Similarly US FINRA approved a proposal that it will now submit to the SEC that requires brokers to disclose to their customers any large recruitment payments they will receive should customers follow them from one firm to another. Exact amounts are not required to be reported, just bands. Broker Dealers hiring new brokers would also be required to report to FINRA certain information too.

For questions or assistance, do not hesitate to contact Gary DeWaal and Associates at (212) 382-4615 or at: [email protected].

For more background, see:

CFTC: In the Matter of Susan Butterfield
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfbutterfieldorder091613.pdf

CFTC Request for Public Comment re: CME EFRP Rule Amendments:
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6696-13

FCA: CEO Martin Wheatley Address to ISDA:
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/future-into-focus

FINRA Recruitment Compensation Proposal:
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2013/P347341

FXDirectDealer regulatory actions:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enffxddorder091813.pdf
http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/CaseDocument.aspx?seqnum=3725

ICE Clear US Notice: September 16, 2013 (50% of guaranty fund deposit required in cash):
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_us/notices/13-093_New_Cash_MinimumReq_GuarantyFund_2013_09_16.pdf

JP Morgan regulatory actions:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/enf20130919a.pdf
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/jpmorgan-chase-bank.pdf
http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2013-140.pdf
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-70458.pdf

National Futures Association CFTA Quarterly Recordkeeping Requirement:
http://www.nfa.futures.org/news/newsNotice.asp?ArticleID=4297

SEC: SEC v. Fredrick D. Scott (USDC EDNY):
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2013/comp-pr2013-180.pdf

SEC Announcement regarding short sale charges and settlements with 22 firms in connection with public offerings; Risk Alert of Rule 105 Compliance
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539804376#.UjofvBaDrFJ
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/risk-alert-091713-rule105-regm.pdf

SEC proposed rule regarding public company CEO compensation:
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2013/33-9452.pdf

Copies of the following documents are available on request to [email protected]:

CFTC v. MF Global, Inc., MF Global Holdings, Ltd., Jon S. Corzine and Edith O’Brien: Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Jon S. Corzine’s Motion to Dismiss Counts I and IV of the Complaint

DRW Investments LLC and Donald R. Wilson, Jr. v. US Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Declaratory Judgment Complaint

Nader Tavakoli, as Litigation Trustee of the MF Global Litigation Trust v. Jon S. Corzine, Bradley L. Abelow and Henri J. Steenkamp: First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

The information contained in this article is not legal advice. For legal advice, please consult with your attorney. The information in this article is derived from sources believed to be reliable as of September 21, 2013, but no representation or warranty is made regarding the accuracy of any statement. To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by U.S. Treasury Regulations, Gary DeWaal and Associates LLC informs you that any U.S. tax advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) was not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein.

 

My View: Reflections on the JP Morgan’s Settlements — Human Nature, Internal Controls, and the CFTC’s Broad New Anti-Manipulation Authority

On September 19, 2013, as widely reported in the media, JP Morgan consented to and was assessed fines by four international regulators totaling US $920 Million related to what has been colloquially referred to as the “London Whale” trades during 2012.These trades caused the Bank to suffer losses of US $6.2 Billion. The four regulators were the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK (GB £137,610,000 (US $220 Million); the US Federal Reserve Bank (US $200 Million); the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (US $300 Million), and the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC; US $200 Million).

According to a Form 8-K filed by the Bank with the SEC on September 19, apparently three regulator investigations related to this matter continue, ones conducted by Massachusetts Securities Division, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the US Department of Justice. The Bank has disclosed, in fact, that the CFTC has provided a so-called “Wells” notice to it notifying the Bank that the Commission staff intends to recommend an enforcement action related to the London Whale incident. JP Morgan has indicated that it will respond to the CFTC’s notice in due course.

Previously, the US Attorney for the Southern District of NY filed criminal charges, and the Securities and Exchange Commission filed civil charges against two JP Morgan employees — Julien Grout, and his supervisor, Javier Martin-Artajo — for over-valuing certain trading positions they initiated to hide the trading losses that are at the heart of the London Whale incident.

There is little I can add to the facts of this matter that already are set forth in detail in all the regulatory complaints, especially those of the FCA and SEC; JP Morgan’s own study of this incident issued during January 2013; and the media reports.

However, the reported history of this matter, as well the apparent pendency of an action by the CFTC, makes me think of two things:

  1. no matter how good they are, all financial services firms remain vulnerable to individual employees doing bad things. Unless a firm’s culture and infrastructure are sufficiently robust, these bad things can go undetected for a period of time causing big losses and profound regulatory expense (not to mention potential private litigation expenses and a loss of reputation harming business too); and
  2. new anti-manipulation authority given to the CFTC in 2010 as part of Dodd Frank is very broad, and the way the Commission has implemented this authority through rule adoption is broader still. Industry participants must carefully consider their proprietary trading activities where intent and proof of an artificial price may no longer be required for a successful CFTC manipulation prosecution.

Internal Controls

In the financial services industry, history has provided us with numerous examples of dishonest firms anchored by dishonest persons, including Charles Ponzi, Bernard Madoff, Allen Stanford, and Russell Wassendorf, Jr., among others.

However, there also have been many other examples where well-regarded financial services firms have been damaged profoundly by employees acting well outside their authority, including Societe Generale by Jerome Kerviel, Barings Bank by Nick Leeson and UBS by Kweku Adoboli, to name a few.

In these latter circumstances, an employee was typically able to obviate a required procedure by exploiting a manual process or other system weakness, and internal risk systems were either tricked or not designed well in the first place to identify the rogue activity. In some cases other normal checks and balances failed or had never been set up properly which delayed detection and understanding of the problem by senior management. And sometimes senior management was slow to react comprehensively even when it received information regarding the problematic activity. The results of all this were large losses and significant regulatory sanctions.

What’s frustrating is that most everyone in senior management in the financial services industry understands the importance of maintaining a strong control environment that includes separating front office and support functions, and placing both within a robust internal control framework that helps detect problems promptly before they get out of hand. However, for one reason or another, typically pressures to increase revenue or decrease costs, or simple human fallibility or arrogance, these structures sprout weaknesses and are exploited.

As a result, the London Whale incident should remind us all again of the need for financial services firms to ensure that:

  1. front office and support functions are separated and are performed by different persons under different supervisors, who receive ongoing training regarding relevant company policies and procedures and applicable law.
  2. strong risk functions, including at least Credit and Market Risk, Internal Audit, Compliance, Legal, and Operational Risk, implement and regularly use robust surveillance tools to monitor for breaches of company policies and procedures and report promptly to independent managers (and where relevant, a Board Audit or equivalent committee) when there are potential issues, especially material ones; and
  3. a company culture is continually supported to encourage speaking out when employees perceive issues, and management acts promptly to address them.

Each of these matters must be supported by comprehensive and updated policies and procedures, regular training, and appropriate financial incentives, as well as empowering managers in support functions to have more equivalent status as top traders and producers.

CFTC Anti-manipulation Authority

When the Dodd Frank law was adopted in 2010, one provision (Section 753) made it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly in connection with:

  1. a swap;
  2. cash commodity contract; or
  3. a regulated futures (or related options) contract,

to engage in any “manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” in violation of any rule or regulation the CFTC was instructed to adopt related to this provision. Shortly afterwards the CFTC instituted two new rules prohibiting fraud-based manipulation that went into effect during August 2011.

One rule (CFTC Rule 180.1) prohibits any person from intentionally or recklessly engaging in deceptive or manipulative practices in connection with any of the enumerated products without regard to price or market effect. These practices include,

  1. using or attempting to use any device or artifice to defraud;
  2. making or attempting to make any untrue statement of a material fact (or omit a material fact necessary to make a statement true or not misleading); or
  3. engaging or attempting to engage in any act that would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.

Even before the recent matter involving the London Whale, the CFTC signaled it would take a very broad view of the reach of this law and rule (i.e., “not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes”), rejecting industry arguments that the proposed rule was vague and failed to provide market participants’ sufficient notice regarding potentially prohibited conduct. The Commission stated that it considers reckless conduct, “as an act or omission that ‘departs so far from the standards of ordinary care that it is very difficult to believe the actor was not aware of what he or she was doing’.”

The other rule (CFTC Rule 180.2) codifies more traditional tests regarding manipulation, including a finding of specific intent and non-bona fide prices. However, when adopting this rule, the CFTC indicated that artificial prices could, in certain circumstances, be “inescapably” presumed by the actions of the alleged manipulator not on analysis of the artificiality of the price itself. In such cases the artificial price would be “conclusively presumed.” (The new Dodd Frank provision and this new rule were enacted in addition to provisions of law already existing prohibiting manipulative activity.)

Potential monetary penalties for manipulative conduct were also increased as a result of Dodd Frank.

Although it is premature to assess what might be the nature of a CFTC action against JP Morgan (if any), the FCA action against the Bank describes in a section entitled “Market Misconduct” (sections 4.71 - 4.77) certain specific trading by the Bank in February 2012 in a certain Credit Default Swap index that it suggests was done nefariously to help limit the damage of certain existing positions, as opposed to engaging in ordinary trading activities. It relies on this trading these to charge the Bank with violating Principle 5 of FCA’s Principles of Businesses that require a firm to observe “proper” standards of market conduct.

Also this week, in an entirely unrelated factual matter, DRW Investments Ltd and its principal, Don Wilson, filed an action against the CFTC in Federal Court in Chicago seeking to prevent the agency from filing an enforcement action against them for unlawful manipulation related to certain orders they placed during January through August 2011. According to the complaint, the orders were bona fide orders that sought to take advantage of certain anomalies in the relevant interest rate swap futures contract cleared by the International Derivatives Clearing House. Apparently the CFTC may view those orders as manipulative conduct.

In either case, it is clear, that the CFTC now has multiple options to prosecute a manipulation claim, and one (CFTC Rule 180.1) permits the CFTC to prosecute persons with a significantly lesser standard of proof than traditional manipulation actions required.

Absent a court setting aside the new relevant provision of Dodd Frank and the new CFTC’s anti-manipulation rules for vagueness, industry participants must be mindful not to engage in trading strategies that could after the fact be caught by the broad reach of these new provisions.

Conclusion

The JP Morgan London Whale incident is regrettably yet another example of internal controls breaking down in the financial services industry. Given the staggering fines and other consequences firms face in connection with rogue trading and other miscreant conduct, firms are encouraged regularly to review their internal control systems and company culture to ensure that material problems – which will never cease to exist because of the nature of humans — are promptly identified and addressed. In connection with potential conduct that may be considered manipulative, this is especially the case given the CFTC’s new expanded authority to prosecute manipulation without proving intent or an artificial price.

For questions or assistance, do not hesitate to contact Gary DeWaal and Associates at (212) 382-4615 or at http://www.garydewaalandassociates.com/request/

For more see:

JP Morgan regulatory actions:

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/enf20130919a.pdf

CFTC: Adoption of Rules 180.1 and 180.2:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2011-17549a.pdf
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/amaf_qa_final.pdf

Financial Conduct Authority:
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/jpmorgan-chase-bank.pdf

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency:
http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2013-140.pdf

Securities and Exchange Commission:
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-70458.pdf

JP Morgan Report on the London Whale:
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2628206174x0x628656/4cb574a0-0bf5-4728-9582-625e4519b5ab/Task_Force_Report.pdf

SEC Form 8-K filed September 19, 2013; access at:
http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/sec.cfm?Doctype=

The DRW matter referred to in this article is:

DRW Investments LLC v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 13-cv-06630, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois (Chicago)

The information contained in this article is not legal advice. For legal advice, please consult with your attorney. The information in this article is derived from sources believed to be reliable as of September 20, 2013, but no representation or warranty is made regarding the accuracy of any statement. To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by U.S. Treasury Regulations, Gary DeWaal and Associates LLC informs you that any U.S. tax advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) was not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein.

Gary DeWaal’s Bridging the Week: September 9 to 13 and 16, 2013

Most of the global news involving financial services during the past week came from the United States and from exchanges regulated by the CFTC. The news involved automated trading, wash sale prevention, and the correct way to conduct exchanges of futures for related positions. The main topics this past week were:

1. CFTC issued a concept release on automated trading; seeks views on 124 questions;
2. ICE Exchanges in US and Europe will require use of self trade prevention functionality as of November 1 for proprietary traders with direct market access;
3. CFTC issued rule enforcement reviews for three exchanges; EFRPs singled out in one (again); and
4. CME seeks to ban all transitory exchanges of futures for related positions (EFRPs) and increase record keeping and other requirements related to non-transitory EFRPs for traders and brokers:

 

 

Automated trading, wash sales prevention and exchanges of futures for related positions dominated the news in financial services during the week of September 9 to 13, 2013.

CFTC Issues Concept Release on Automated Trading; Seeks Answers to 124 Questions

On September 9, 2013, the CFTC issued a concept release on risk controls and system safeguards for automated trading environments that was also discussed at a meeting of the CFTC’s Technology Advisory Committee on September 12.

In this Concept Release, the CFTC sets forth its views regarding the principal actors and risks involved with automated trading, and preventative measures taken to date to mitigate such risks. The Commission also provides a comprehensive discussion and poses 124 questions related to further potential mitigation of such risks for which it seeks responses from the industry, including whether any regulatory action is necessary, such as giving the CFTC authority to seek higher civil fines. The CFTC also singles out high frequency trading as a specific type of automated trading and seeks comment whether HFT should receive different regulatory treatment.

(For more on this Concept Release, see an article posted on this website on September 9, 2013, entitled “CFTC Issues Release on Automated Trading; Asks if More Regulation and Higher Fines are Necessary” at http://www.garydewaalandassociates.com/?p=873.)

At the TAC September 12 meeting, industry participants generally applauded the comprehensive and thoughtful nature of the concept release, but cautioned against the proposal or adoption of rules that might be too narrow and single out only a subset of industry actors, when relevant problematic conduct is engaged in by many types of market participants using different types of order entry means and speeds.

Comments to the CFTC’s concept release are due by close of business December 11, 2013

ICE Exchanges in US and Europe Require Use of Self Trade Prevention Functionality as of November 1

ICE Futures US and ICE Futures Europe both will require proprietary traders with direct market access to ICE trading engines and who use algorithmic programs to use its Self Trade Prevention Functionality (STPF) as of November 1 to help avoid inadvertent wash sale transactions. Other market participants are encouraged to use this functionality now, although this functionality may become mandatory for other participants at a later date too.

Impacted proprietary traders can utilize ICE’s STPF at various levels, including the mandatory authorized trader level, as well as on an inter or intra company basis, or for the same account. STPF permits various alternative conducts to occur when a potential matched trade might occur, including (1) rejecting the new order that would cause a match with a resting order, (2) rejecting the resting order that would cause a match with a new order, or (3) rejecting both the new and resting order if the orders, if executed, would match.

The Chicago Mercantile Exchange currently has an optional Self Match Prevention Functionality (SMPF) too in connection with GLOBEX access. On July 9, 2013, CME submitted to the CFTC a request to approve a Market Regulation Advisory Notice (MRAN) that provides updated guidance related to the CME’s prohibition against wash trades as well as information related to its SMPF. The CME had hoped for this Advisory to be approved by the CFTC for issuance by September 9, but this approval is still pending. As part of this process, the CFTC sought public comments on the CME’s proposed MRAN through August 14. (For more on this, see an article first posted on this website on June 14, 2013, entitled “Compliance Weeds: CME Proposes New Guidance Regarding Wash Trades Effective September 9, 2013 Pending CFTC Approval” at http://www.garydewaalandassociates.com/compliance-weeds-cme-issues-new-guidance-regarding-wash-trades/.)

CFTC Issues Rule Enforcement Reviews for Three DCMs; EFRPs Singled Out in One (Again)

Last week the CFTC issued rule enforcement reviews of three Designated Contract Markets (DCMs): CBOE Futures Exchange, LLC (CFE), ELX Futures, LP and the Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Inc. The CFTC found that each of the DCMs generally complied with its obligations under relevant core principles, although it issued recommendations for improvements. (For two DCMs, CFE and ELX, the National Futures Association provides certain relevant regulatory services including trade practice and market surveillance, and related investigatory work.)

However, as with its rule enforcement review of the CME issued on August 2, 2013, the CFTC made a number of recommendations regarding NFA’s monitoring of Exchange of Futures for Related Position transactions on the ELX that continues to put the industry on notice regarding the CFTC’s heightened interest in these transactions. Specifically, the CFTC recommended that NFA for ELX should (1) include matched EFRP transactions in its random review of all transactions; (2) strategically select more EFRP transactions in connection with its random reviews to detect misconduct; and (3) in addition to its random reviews, ensure it reviews EFRP transactions for every Clearing Privilege Holder at least once every calendar year.

FCMs and trading firms should review their own internal procedures related to their handling of EFRPs in light of these recommendations issued to DCMs.

(For more on this, see an article posted on this website on August 6, 2013, entitled “Alphabet Soup under CFTC Scrutiny: CFTC Review of CME Handling of EFRPs Suggests Tougher Times for Traders and FCMs: Time to be Pro-Active!” at http://www.garydewaalandassociates.com/?p=550.)

CME Seeks to Ban All Transitory EFRPs and Increase Recordkeeping and Other Requirements related to Non-transitory EFRPs

In a related matter, the CME has proposed to prohibit transitory EFRPs in connection with all its products. Currently, transitory EFRPs are permitted in connection with New York Mercantile Exchange energy products, Commodity Exchange and Nymex metals products, and CME foreign exchange products. The CME made its proposal in a filing to the CFTC on September 12 and has asked the CFTC to post its filing, which included proposed amended rules and a revised Frequently Asked Questions related to EFRPs, for notice and public comment.

In addition, the CME is also seeking to amend and/or clarify certain recordkeeping and compliance obligations in connection with non-transitory EFRPs. Among other things, the CME is proposing to require in all circumstances opposing accounts to an EFRP be independently controlled; to codify that futures or options contracts may not be used as the related position component of an EFRP; to permit EFPs to be used in connection with inventory financing of storable energy or metals commodities in addition to storable agricultural commodities; and to clarify that in connection with brokered EFRP transactions, brokers must maintain all records related to their facilitation.

The CME’s proposed FAQs also provides additional guidance related to the responsibilities of firms that execute or clear EFRPs on behalf of their customers including guidelines (1) related to recordkeeping requirements, (2) the identification of EFRP transactions on all customer statements; (3) the provision of information related to CME’s EFRP requirements to all customers; and the (4) establishment, documentation and execution of controls that “are reasonably designed to prevent and detect the execution of non-bona fide EFRPs.”

For questions or assistance, do not hesitate to contact Gary DeWaal and Associates at (212) 382-4615 or at http://www.garydewaalandassociates.com/request/

The information contained in this article is not legal advice. For legal advice, please consult with your attorney. The information in this article is derived from sources believed to be reliable as of September 15, 2013, but no representation or warranty is made regarding the accuracy of any statement.

For more see:

CFTC Concept Release on Automated Trading;
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-22185a.pdf

CFTC Rule Enforcement Review: CBOE Futures:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@iodcms/documents/file/rercfe090613.pdf

CFTC Rule Enforcement Review: ELX:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@iodcms/documents/file/rerelx090613.pdf

CFTC Rule Enforcement Review: Minneapolis Grain Exchange:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@iodcms/documents/file/rermgex090613.pdf

CME: Proposed Amended Rules and FAQ related to EFRPs :
http://www.cmegroup.com/market-regulation/files/13-381.pdf

CME Proposed Market Regulation Advisory Notice regarding Wash Trades:
http://www.cmegroup.com/market-regulation/files/13-272.pdf

ICE Europe (Self Trade Prevention Functionality):
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/circulars/13127.pdf
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/futures/IFEU_Self_Trade_Prevention_Policy.pdf
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/futures/IFEU_Self_Trade_Prevention_FAQ.pdf

ICE US (Self Trade Prevention Functionality):
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/futures_us/exchange_notices/ExNot091113STPFFinal.pdf

News Development: CFTC Issues Concept Release on Automated Trading; Asks If More Regulation and Higher Fines Are Necessary

The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission on September 9, 2013, issued a “Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments.” In this Concept Release, the CFTC provides its views regarding the principal actors and risks involved with automated trading, and preventative measures taken to date to mitigate such risks. The Commission also provides a comprehensive discussion and poses 124 questions related to the further potential mitigation of such risks for which it seeks responses from the industry, including whether any regulatory action is necessary, such as giving the CFTC authority to seek higher civil fines.

For the Commission, automated trading covers a wide range of activities, from automated order placement and cancellation at the front end by market participants, to automated order matching and execution by exchanges, and the automated transmission of market data to market participants at the back end.

Among questions that may raise some eyebrows include those related to whether firms operating automated trading systems in CFTC-regulated markets and/or software firms providing algorithms should be required to register with the Commission in some capacity (if not currently registered); whether exchanges should impose minimum time periods for which orders must remain on an order book before being withdrawn; whether the Commission or Congress should increase the maximum potential civil penalties for violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, particularly as they relate to automated trading; and the role clearing firms should play in the operation or calibration of throttles on orders submitted by trading firms whose trades they guarantee.

In addition, the CFTC seeks comments regarding the potential benefits and costs of each potential risk mitigant. Also, the CFTC seeks to determine whether one group of automated traders – so-called high frequency traders – should receive separate regulatory attention

Answers to the questions posed by the Commission are due 90 days after the Concept Release is published in the Federal Register.

The Concept Release follows a number of well-publicized events involving automated trading, including the Flash Crash in May 2010 and the major loss suffered by Knight Capital Group during 2012 when it experienced troublesome issues with new software, as well as various software and other failures at US stock exchange operators causing exchanges to shut down for some time or experience other problems, including recent issues at NASDAQ.

Previously, during October 2011, IOSCO issued a study regarding “Regulatory Issues Raised by the Impact of Technological Changes on Market Integrity and Efficiency,” and the Futures Industry Association in April 2010 issued “Market Access Risk Management Recommendations.” These reports covered many of the same issues now addressed by the CFTC. In June 2011 the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted a rule (15c3-5) requiring brokers and dealers with access to exchanges or alternative trading systems, or who provide others with direct access to such venues, to maintain certain risk management and supervisory controls. This rule mostly became effective during July 2011, and wholly effective shortly thereafter.

In voting to approve issuance of the Concept Release, CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler said, “[t]his Concept Release is intended to stir public discussion and debate on how best to protect the functioning of markets for the benefit of farmers, ranchers, merchants and other end users who rely on markets to hedge risk — particularly in light of the reality that the majority of the market is using automated trading systems.”

The Technology Advisory Committee of the CFTC is scheduled to discuss the Concept Release at its next public meeting, scheduled for September 12.

As an aside, in the Concept Release, the CFTC indicates that by the end of 2012 it will issue final rules on the offer by exchanges of co-location and hosting services. Proposed rules were issued during June 2010.

For questions or assistance, do not hesitate to contact Gary DeWaal and Associates at (212) 382-4615 or at http://www.garydewaalandassociates.com/request/

The information contained in this article is not legal advice. For legal advice, please consult with your attorney. The information in this article is derived from sources believed to be reliable as of September 9, 2013, but no representation or warranty is made regarding the accuracy of any statement.

For more see:

CFTC Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/federalregister090913.pdf

CFTC Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Co-location/Proximity Hosting Services:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2010-13613a.pdf

FIA Market Access Risk Management Recommendations:
http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/Market_Access-6.pdf

IOSCO Regulatory Issues Raised by the Impact of Technological Changes on Market Integrity and Efficiency:
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD361.pdf

SEC Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access (15c3-5):
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/34-63241.pdf

Gary DeWaal’s Bridging the Week: September 2 to 6 and 9, 2013

Last week, September 2-6, 2013, did not see a lot of material stories worldwide impacting the financial services industry, but a few items warrant review:

  1. the UK FCA sued and settled with Aberdeen Asset Managers and Aberdeen Fund Management, large asset managers, for approximately $11.25 Million regarding customer protection rules’ violations;
  2. the USA CFTC sued and settled with Macquarie Futures USA, LLC for $150,000 also regarding customer protection rules’ violations;
  3. the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and IOSCO issued their “Final Framework Regarding Margin for Non-Cleared Derivatives;”
  4. ESMA’s issued advice to the European Commission on six countries’ (including the USA’s) rule equivalence to EMIR;
  5. the USA CFTC issued No Action relief for reporting by certain CPOs trading for Controlled Foreign Corporations,

and more:

 

 

It would be unfair to say that last week, September 2-6, 2013, was the slowest week this year regarding regulatory news impacting financial services’ firms worldwide. However when one of the most significant regulatory developments was a press release on the website of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission heralding “Improved Pet Insurance Disclosure,” perhaps it wasn’t one the most active weeks of regulatory news either (although improved pet insurance disclosure is surely important to pet owners).

That being said, there were a few very important items worth reviewing discussed on this week’s Bridging the Week.

First and foremost, with the media reporting that the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission will imminently release its final rules on enhanced customer protection prompted by the collapse of MF Global and Peregrine Financial Group, two international regulators, including the CFTC and the Financial Conduct Authority in the United Kingdom, both announced last week enforcement actions against firms for violating current customer protection rules.

FCA v Aberdeen Asset Managers and Aberdeen Fund Management

In the more significant of these two matters, in the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority brought an enforcement action and settled with Aberdeen Asset Managers and Aberdeen Fund Management, large asset managers, for payment of a fine of GB£7.2 Million (US$11.25 Million) related to their failure to protect client funds as required under law.

According to FCA, from August 31, 2008 through August 31, 2011, the respondents failed to recognize that certain monies it placed with banks on behalf of their clients were governed by UK’s client money rules (its so-called CASS regime), and therefore did not obtain appropriate acknowledgments from such banks holding the customer funds regarding the nature of such funds. These customer funds were typically invested in money market deposits.

The Financial Services Authority, the predecessor of the FCA, previously had requested respondents (as well as other industry firms) to confirm that they were fully compliant with all relevant customer protection rules and they did so in 2010.

CFTC v. Macquarie Futures USA, LLC

In the USA, the CFTC brought and simultaneously settled an enforcement action against Macquarie Futures USA LLC for its failure to maintain adequate funds in its so-called Secured Accounts as of close of business for one day. Secured accounts are the type of accounts where funds are held in connection with a US FCM’s customers’ non-US futures trading.

In this case, Macquarie Futures’ failure originated from a Haley’s comet once in a lifetime type event related to ICE Clear Europe’s conversion of energy swaps to energy futures.

Even though Macquarie Future self-reported and corrected its breach the following day, and even though the firm had sufficient funds set aside for its customers overall in all of its customer funds’ protected locations, because approximately $38 Million of the funds were not in the Secured Accounts (but in Segregated Accounts instead – the accounts used for customer funds in connection with US futures trading), the CFTC brought this action. For this matter, Macquarie Futures was required to pay a fine of $150,000 + prejudgment interest.

This action should prompt thinking among registrants regarding what type of enforcement actions the CFTC may take when it sees the material compliance issues they disclose in their 2013 Annual Compliance Reports scheduled to be filed with the Commission in most cases during the first quarter of next year! (Don’t forget to review a separate article on this website regarding practical tips for preparing a firm’s Annual Compliance Report: http://www.garydewaalandassociates.com/its-10-pm-fcms-sds-msps-do-you-know-the-status-of-your-firms-2013-annual-compliance-report-preparation/.)

A couple of developments related to the centrally cleared and non-centrally cleared derivatives also made news last week.

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision/IOSCO Final Framework Regarding Margin for Non-Cleared Derivatives

First and foremost, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and IOSCO released the final framework for requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives that should be adopted by international regulators.

According to the Framework, all financial firms and systemically important non-financial firms will have to exchange initial and variation margin appropriate in light of the counterparty risk for each derivatives transaction, and initial margin will have to be exchanged on a gross not net basis. However no initial margin will have to be exchanged in connection with FX forwards and FX swaps transactions. The Framework also proposed restrictions on a receiving firm’s re-hypothecation of a counterparty’s initial margin deposits.

The agencies recommend that these margin requirements be phased in over time.

ESMA’s Advice on Six Countries’ Rule Equivalence to EMIR

Second, ESMA last week issued its advice to the European Commission regarding the equivalence of non-EU derivatives rules to EMIR in six jurisdictions: Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland and the USA. Under EMIR, a non-EU central clearing counterparty (CCP) or trade repository can only offer its services to EU citizens if the EC finds its oversight regulations equivalent to EMIR. If equivalence is found on other rules, in connection with a derivatives trade between a EU-based and non-EU-based entity, the parties may choose to apply the relevant rules of the jurisdiction of the non-EU entity to the transaction.

In general all relevant rules of the USA were judged conditionally equivalent, while all CCP rules of the other countries were assessed conditionally equivalent or equivalent. The jury is out on most of the other jurisdictions’ other rules.

HK Proposed Licensing Rules for Derivatives Intermediaries

In connection with one of the discussed jurisdictions, last week regulators in Hong Kong released conclusions emanating from the consultation regarding the scope of activities to be regulated under Hong Kong’s OTC derivatives regime. In general there was support for proposals (1) to extend the licensing regime to cover intermediaries that conduct derivatives activities; (2) that there be a transitional period in connection with implementing such regime; and (3) that the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Securities and Futures Commission should have effective regulatory authority over systemically important market participants. A bill incorporating these proposals was introduced to the HK Legislative Council during July 2013.

And briefly, last week:

  • G-20 Progress on Implementing Post 2008 Recommendations: the Financial Stability Board issued a progress report on the implementation of the post 2008 G-20 recommendations for strengthening financial stability. Frankly you have to take the results with a grain of salt. Although the report acknowledges that the end-2012 deadline to centrally clear and trade on exchanges or electronic trading platforms all standardized OTC derivatives contracts was not met, the FSB gave the status of this policy development a grade of “Green,” meaning that the policy is on track to be developed consistent with plan;
  • CPO Trading for Controlled Foreign Corporations. The CFTC issued a no action letter that permits commodity pool operators of registered funds that trade on behalf of controlled foreign corporations under certain circumstances to report, for financial reporting purposes, a registered fund and its CFC on a consolidated basis. However this relief is not self-executing. Eligible CPOs must file a notice of claim in advance with the CFTC containing certain required information; and
  • NFA Rule related to Violations of CFTC Rules for Swap Dealers and MSPs. the National Futures Association proposed adoption of a new rule (NFA Rule 2-49) relevant to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants that would make a violation of certain of the CFTC’s rules a violation of NFA requirements too.

This week the CFTC is expected to release its concept release on automated trading which is scheduled to be discussed at the CFTC’s Technology Advisory Committee on September 12.

For questions or assistance, do not hesitate to contact Gary DeWaal and Associates at (212) 382-4615 or at http://www.garydewaalandassociates.com/request/

The information contained in this article is not legal advice. For legal advice, please consult with your attorney. The information in this article is derived from sources believed to be reliable as of September 6, 2013, but no representation or warranty is made regarding the accuracy of any statement.

For more, see:

ASIC Enhanced Pet Insurance Disclosure Requirement:
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/13-249MR+ASIC+welcomes+improved+pet+insurance+disclosure?openDocument

BIS and IOSCO: Margin Requirements for Non-centrally Cleared Derivatives:
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs261.pdf

CFTC: No Action Letter for CPOs of Registered Funds with Controlled Foreign Corporations:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/13-51.pdf

CFTC: Order re: Macquarie Futures USA LLC:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfmacquarieorder090313.pdf

ESMA Advice to the EC on the Equivalence of non-European Derivatives Rules (Press Release only which contains links to individual countries):
http://www.esma.europa.eu/Press%20Release%20-%20ESMA%20advises%20Commission%20on%20equivalence%20of%20non-European%20derivatives%20rules

FCA: Final Notice re: Aberdeen Asset Managers Limited and Aberdeen Fund Management Limited:
http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/final-notices/2013/aberdeen

FSB Progress Report on G-20 Mandated Financial Reforms:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/13-51.pdf

HKMA and SFC: Consultation Conclusions regarding the OTC Regulatory Regime in HK:
http://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/consultation/conclusion?refNo=12CP2

NFA Proposed Rule 2-49:
http://www.nfa.futures.org/news/PDF/CFTC/CR_2-49_081513.pdf

 

Summer Reading You May Have Missed — An Important Article on Systemic Risks by DTCC: But Did They Identify the Top Risks?

While much of Wall Street, The City and continental Europe were away for summer vacation this past August, Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation published an important thought piece on the most significant systemic risks impacting the financial services industry today and likely tomorrow, entitled “Beyond the Horizon.” This publication deserves the attention of everyone in the financial services business for serious reflection and prompt consideration regarding systemic risks their businesses confront, appropriate mitigation efforts, and opportunities, if any. But did DTCC identify the top systemic risks?

According to DTCC, among the largest emerging systemic risks are:

  • cyber attacks;
  • the speed of high frequency trades relative to industry risk infrastructures;
  • the concentrated nature of key clearance and settlement functions within a few brokers and central clearing counterparties; and
  • regulatory safeguards that are either years from implementation or introduce new risks.

In fact, DTCC identified 13 major systemic risks overall. The others are counterparty risk; collateral risk; market quality risk; liquidity risk; interconnectedness risk; securities settlement risk; business continuity risk; shadow banking risk; and Eurozone risks.

However curiously, DTCC does not identify as the most significant systemic risk, the risk that brokers in the financial services industry – who, particularly in the futures industry, provide the financial backbone to the clearing process – generate insufficient profits to invest in systems necessary to protect themselves against the serious systemic risks highlighted by DTCC, let alone day to day credit, market, operational and compliance risks.

Indeed, just a quick reflection on the common denominator between the top two broker insolvencies during 2011 and 2012 – MF Global and Peregrine Financial Group – reminds us all of how challenging it has been in the first place for brokers to generate adequate ROEs since the 2008 financial crisis. In both instances the firms’ principals were trying to address their firms’ lack of profitability when they embarked on paths (in one case, outright theft) that ultimately led to their firms’ collapse.

Moreover, some of the risks that futures brokers who are clearing members of Central Clearing Counterparties confront may be totally outside their control and which they cannot readily protect themselves – the risk of a fellow member default at a clearing house after which they may lose all or some of their guaranty fund deposit, be liable for an additional clearing house contribution, or receive an allocation of positions, including some very volatile and risky transactions, previously held by the defaulting member (some of these issues are discussed in the August 12, 2013 CPSS/IOSCO Consultative Report on the Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures). It is also possible they may have to deal with initial or variation margin haircuts for their own proprietary positions, or positions on behalf of their clients.

Firms will improve profitability by continuing to be mindful of all costs (including potential contingent costs) and emphasizing aspects of their business that differentiate themselves from their competitors. Bigger is not necessarily better, and when business is capital intensive as some aspects of financial services are, the highest ROEs will be awarded to those firms that offer the most differentiated service to their clients. A niche, high quality offering is often the most sensible offering in this environment, in my view.

However, at some point there will also need to be serious discussions regarding the allocation of risks (typically to clearing members) and rewards (typically to shareholders) at CCPss, and the process of de-mutulization that was so heralded just a few decades ago. It seems very strange that a cornerstone of the financial services industry promoted by the G-20 post the 2008 Financial Crisis – central clearing – is premised on a reinsurance model where effectively the insurer (i.e., a CCP), who collects ongoing premiums on an ongoing basis from the insureds (i.e., fees from clearing members) also demands payments from the insureds (e.g., assessments from clearing members) when there is an industry catastrophe requiring the insurer to pay up.

Another top risk that DTCC may have underestimated, is regulatory and litigation risk, namely the potential cost to firms of wrong-doing – not only in terms of fines, payments to plaintiffs and legal costs (not to mention the opportunity cost when businessmen spend time preparing for litigation as opposed to developing business), but lost business because of harm to reputation.

Indeed, newspapers are daily filled with stories about criminal and civil actions against financial service participants. LIBOR, ISDAfix, LME warehouses, FERC, mortgage related matters, and numerous insider-trading matters are just a few acronyms and terms that most educated citizens had no idea about a few years ago, but now see routinely discussed in the financial media, let alone sometimes as the top story on the television evening news. And the implications are expensive. As of December 2012, JP Morgan Chase estimated that in excess of already established reserves, it could sustain additional losses up to $6.1 Billion because of its various legal contingencies, while Goldman Sachs estimated its aggregate losses because of its actual or potential legal proceedings at up to $3.5 billion. By comparison, the GDP of 30 countries were less than $3 billion during 2011.

It is no secret that regulatory actions and private litigation are expensive. The only way to help minimize problems is to continue to emphasize a culture where it’s not only about profits, but that a firm’s principles of conduct mean something too. This is what a compliance culture is all about. And central to a strong compliance culture are compensation arrangements within firms that reward not only the profit makers, but differentiate between employees who break the rules, live by the rules as minimally as possible, or truly embrace and act according to a firm’s principles of conduct.

However, despite downplaying the importance of profitability and legal/regulatory risk, DTCC’s analysis is outstanding.

DTCC’s discussion of the danger of cyber attacks is downright terrifying. According to it, in 2013 56% of exchanges surveyed reported experiencing a cyber attack during the last year. And there are three types of cyber attacks that are worrisome: those aimed at:

  • causing market disruption by preventing business transactions (eg, affecting clearance, settlement or other core functions). This is typically done by flooding the network connectivity between a financial entity and the broader internet;
  • causing market disruption by deleting, modifying, or corrupting a firm’s books and records. This is done by infiltrating an institution’s own systems or a server outside the firm; and
  • reducing confidence in the financial services industry through insider trading and other forms of market manipulation. Some of these actions are taken by hactivists, nation states and paid hackers who are compensated based on how successful their disruptions are.

Firms are already spending great resources to confront cyber risks and the industry is frequently conducting more sophisticated preparedness tests (e.g., SIFMA’s Quantum Dawn 2 cyber security exercise on July 18, 2013) but the bad guys are persistent and deploying increasingly sophisticated technology that firms need to try to anticipate and defend against.

And DTCC is also very accurate in considering the impact of developing regulations: in many cases, they are expensive to implement and arguably do not even achieve the objective the regulator seeks, let alone sometimes create a contrary result. Consider the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s proposal in response to the insolvency of MF Global to require all futures brokers to ensure that they maintain as so-called “residual interest” an amount 24/7 equal to clients’ margin obligations – even when there is no expectation that the clients will not pay their obligations on a timely, even on a same day, basis. This proposal is based on a new interpretation of the relevant law by the CFTC after 30+ years of a different interpretation. However, in fact, the likely outcome of this proposal will be for futures brokers to require customers to post extra funds in advance of trading. So at the same time customers desire to have less exposure to their brokers, the CFTC will cause them to have greater exposure. Moreover, the “solution” does not address the problem of MF Global anyway — namely a break down of internal controls.

In any case, “Beyond the Horizon” is well worth reviewing, and more importantly, thinking about in terms of the risks each financial services firm believes its confronts and how it is going about to mitigate them. Moreover, addressing these risks can sometimes create business opportunities for savvy financial institutions that can market their bulwarks as an additional reason why customers should trade through them, as opposed to a competitor!

For questions or assistance, do not hesitate to contact Gary DeWaal and Associates at (212) 382-4615 or at http://www.garydewaalandassociates.com/request/

The information contained in this article is not legal advice. For legal advice, please consult with your attorney. The information in this article is derived from sources believed to be reliable as of August 31, 2013, but no representation or warranty is made regarding the accuracy of any statement.

For more, see:

http://www.dtcc.com/downloads/leadership/whitepapers/Beyond_the_Horizon_White_Paper_Systemic_Risk.pdf

Regarding matters referenced in this article:

SIFMA’s Quantum Dawn 2:
http://www.sifma.org/services/bcp/cybersecurity-exercise-quantum-dawn-2/

IOSCO/CPSS Consultative Document of Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures:
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD418.pdf

It’s 10 PM: FCMs, SDs, MSPs — Do You Know the Status of Your Firm’s 2013 Annual Compliance Report Preparation?

Now that summer is almost over, Chief Compliance Officers (CCO) of swap dealers (SD), major swap participants (MSP), and future commission merchants (FCM) should be well underway in the process that ultimately will lead to the preparation of their firm’s Annual Compliance Report for the fiscal year ending 2013, and the certification of the report by the CCO or the Chief Executive Officer of their firm. This report will have to be filed with the CFTC within 90 days of a firm’s fiscal year end, but perhaps as soon as 60 days after a firm’s fiscal year end in some circumstances.

CCOs that have not begun this process should do so promptly in order to avoid last minute conflicts with other senior officers over what information should be included in their firm’s Annual Compliance Report and how it should be stated. Late preparation could make possible disagreements more contentious because all certifications must be made “under penalty of law,” meaning that the certifying officer has potential administrative, civil and/or criminal liability should it be determined that an Annual Compliance Report was not accurate or complete and that the signatory had reason to know of this failure.

A. The Right Stuff: Authority and Responsibilities of CCO

By now, each SD, MSP and FCM should have appointed a CCO. This person should have meaningful seniority and experience, as he or she is required by the CFTC to “have the background and skills appropriate for fulfilling the responsibilities of the position.” (CFTC Rule §3.3(b).) The CCO must have been designated as a principal of the firm and must report to the firm’s Board of Directors, the senior officer of the firm, or if the firm is large and multi-faceted, the senior officer of the relevant division (e.g., head of the Futures Division). (CFTC Regulations §§ 3.1(a)(1) and 3.3(a)(1), and 77 Federal Register No. 64 (April 3, 2012), pg. 20160.)

Unfortunately, in many international firms or combined broker dealer-FCMs, it may have been common for a US-based CCO, particularly related to a specific business unit (e.g., FCM) to report exclusively to a more senior US Head of Compliance of all business units, and/or to a Global Head of Compliance, perhaps one based outside the United States. However, these arrangements had to be modified to create a reporting line by the CCO to the firm’s Board of Directors or senior officer too. However, where a CCO has dual (or even more multiple) reporting lines, the reporting line to the Board of Directors or senior officer must be meaningful and cannot solely constitute window dressing. The CCO cannot report to a Committee of the Board as a substitute to reporting to the full Board. (77 Federal Register No. 64, pg. 20160.)

If an entity has multiple registration categories (e.g., FCM and SD, as well as broker dealer) it may have separate persons serving as CCO for each distinct category, or it may have one or more persons serving as CCO for one or more registration categories. However, there must be a specifically identified CCO for each SD, MSP and FCM registration category within an entity, and each person designated as the CCO of an SD, MSP and/or FCM must have a distinct reporting line to their firm’s Board of Directors or senior officer. It is not permissible to designate multiple CCOs as servicing any individual SD, MSP or FCM, even if the compliance function supporting such role is organized to reflect specific expertise (e.g., separate CCOs for FCM execution and FCM clearing are not permitted as an FCM can have only one designated CCO).

It is permissible, however, for multiple entities within a group structure to designate the same person as a CCO, although the CCO of the SD, MSP or FCM will have to report to the Board of Directors or senior officer of the relevant SD, MSP or FCM among his or her reporting lines. Likewise, it is permissible for a person appointed as CCO to have multiple functions within the SD, MSP or FCM, including serving as a member of the legal department or even as General Counsel too. However, the individual’s CCO and non-CCO functions must be clearly delineated, and if the CCO also serves as a lawyer, his or her reports prepared as CCO typically cannot be subject to the attorney-client or attorney-work product privileges. (77 Federal Register No. 64, pgs. 20157, 20161.)

In all circumstances,

  1. only the Board of Directors or senior officer of the SD, MSP or FCM registrant may remove the CCO; and
  2. the Board of Directors or senior officer of the SD, MSP or FCM must,
    • appoint the CCO;
    • approve the CCO’s compensation; and
    • meet with the CCO at least once a year and at such other times as requested by the CCO

(CFTC Regulations §3.3(a)(1-2); also 77 Federal Register No. 64, pgs. 20158, 20161.)

This does not appear to mean that there cannot be input by other corporate officers or even that the initiation for any of the described actions cannot originate from elsewhere in an organization.

Within the firm, the CCO must have sufficient stature (in the CFTC’s word, “authority;” CFTC Regulations §3.3(a)) to:

  1. administer the firm’s policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance with the firm’s obligations under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and the CFTC’s rules (the so called “Compliance Policies” of the firm);
  2. in consultation with the firm’s Board of Directors or senior officer (including possibly the division head), resolve any conflicts of interest as they arise;
  3. take reasonable steps to ensure the firm’s compliance with the CEA and CFTC rules;
  4. establish Compliance Policies in consultation with the Board or the senior officer to resolve non-compliance issues he or she identifies;
  5. establish procedures, in consultation with the Board or the senior officer for the handling, management response, resolution, retesting and closing of non-compliance issues; and
  6. prepare and sign the firm’s Annual Compliance Report.

(CFTC Regulations §3.3(d)(1-6).)

In evaluating the stature of the CCO within an organization, consider that no other job description for any other employee is so particularized by the CFTC. If the CCO does not have sufficient authority, it will be difficult for him or her to perform his or her required responsibilities. In fact, as part of the annual report, the CCO, at a minimum, will have to acknowledge (by his or her signature, if not certification) that he or she has sufficient “authority,” by attesting to the firm’s compliance with, among other rules, the relevant CFTC rule requiring the establishment of the CCO position in the first instance! (CFTC Regulations §3.3.)

Although each of the CCO’s defined tasks are critical, this article addresses solely the CCO of FCM’s, SD’s and MSP’s obligation to prepare and sign, and potentially certify a registrant’s Annual Compliance Report.

B. Meat and Potatoes: Mandatory Sections of the Annual Compliance Report

Again, as with the CCO’s job description, the CFTC through its regulations and No Action Letters has stated certain minimum information that must be contained in the Annual Compliance Report and/or that it expects to see. This information is:

  1. an introduction and an executive summary that:
    • describes the firm’s business;
    • identifies the CEO and CCO of the firm; and
    • identifies the time period covered by the annual report; and

2. a review of the firm’s Compliance Policies generally. This must include:

    • an identification and description of each of the Firm’s Compliance Policies pertaining to the Firm’s business as a SD, MSP and/or FCM, including its Code of Ethics and conflict of interest policies, that are reasonably designed to ensure that the Firm complies with each of its obligations under all provisions of the CEA and CFTC rules that pertain to it;
    • an assessment of the effectiveness of the firm’s Compliance Policies as of the firm’s fiscal year end;
    • a discussion of areas for improvement including recommendations for changes or improvements to the firm’s compliance program and resources dedicated to compliance; and
    • an identification of any material changes to the firm’s Compliance Policies during the time period covered by the Annual Compliance Report.

The Firm’s Annual Compliance Report must also describe:

3. any material non-compliance issues and the action taken in response, including corrective actions; and

4. the financial, managerial, operational and staffing resources the Firm dedicates for compliance to the CEA and CFTC rules, including identifying any material deficiencies in such resources.

(CFTC Regulations §3.3(e)(1-5); CFTC No Action Letter 12-47 (December 10, 2012), pgs 3-4.)

C. Ready, Set, Go: Possible Internal Process to Prepare the Annual Compliance Report Step by Step

Although only certain minimum information must be provided to the CFTC as part of a registrant’s Annual Compliance Report (as described above in Section B), the process to prepare the report most likely requires review of a substantially larger amount of information. This information should be assembled and evaluated in as organized a fashion as possible, so that the information the CCO determines to include in the Annual Compliance Report can be accessed easily.

Step 1: Determine what provisions of the CEA and CFTC Regulations are applicable to the registrant

A possible starting point to prepare a firm’s Annual Compliance Report is for each SD, MSP or FCM is to create a formal inventory of provisions of the CEA and CFTC Regulations that are relevant to it. There is no set way to do this. Among other ways, this can be done by the firm listing on a spreadsheet or other system in one column (or area) law by law and rule by rule all applicable requirements. It may be helpful to include both the relevant section and a short summary of the requirement for the firm, with perhaps a link to the full relevant provision.

Care must be taken in connection with certain CFTC rules that allow an act to be undertaken solely if done in accordance with the rules of a contract market (e.g., certain non-competitive trades are authorized solely if undertaken in accordance with the rules of the relevant contract market (CFTC Regulations §1.38(a))). Arguably, such rules require a firm to comply with the relevant contract market rule in order to comply with the relevant CFTC rule. Also, not all legal requirements under the CEA necessarily have a corresponding CFTC rule defining or implementing it (e.g., CEA prohibitions against violating bids or offers, or engaging in spoofing (CEA §4c(a)(5))).

Although it seems onerous to require a full inventory of all relevant laws and CFTC rules, it would be risky for a CCO unilaterally to limit such an inventory to material laws and rules only. (The CFTC appears legally able to grant relief to FCMs in this area because under the plain language of the relevant CEA provision (CEA §4d(d)) it has full discretion to identify whatever duties and responsibilities it assigns to CCOs.)

This does not appear to mean that, in connection with the formal compliance report submitted to the CFTC, a CCO cannot group related rules into a specific category when it describes its Compliance Policies related to such rules (e.g., Customer Protection Rules; see CFTC No Action Letter 13-03 (March 28, 2013), fn. 13). However, it probably is best that, in such case, the firm elsewhere in the report identify which specific sections of the CEA and rules constitute the relevant category in its view.

Step 2. Determine which Compliance Policies (or sections) are reasonably designed to enable the firm to comply with relevant sections of the CEA and CFTC Regulations

After this inventory is completed, a second column (or another area) should be included, that allows the firm to link each Compliance Policy (and the relevant section of such policy) with the specific CEA provision or CFTC rule it is meant to address. It is possible that at the time of initial preparation, there will be no policy or procedure addressing a specific legal or regulatory requirement.

To a certain extent, inclusion of a Compliance Policy here entails a formal assessment: if the identified Compliance Policy was followed entirely as drafted, is it more likely than not that the firm would be in full compliance with the relevant provision of the CEA or CFTC rules.

Unless the subject matter of the relevant CEA provision or Commission rule is under the jurisdiction of the CCO him or herself, the CCO should consult with the relevant department head to determine, in the first instance, which Compliance Policy is reasonably designed to achieve compliance, as well as the specific section.

Department heads themselves may rely on information provided by subordinates, but the senior manager must have a reasonable basis to rely on information. All representations relied on by the CCO or any department head should be in writing and be formally acknowledged by the employee making the representation.

However, in the end, the CCO must apply a reasonable independent judgment to determine whether, in fact, in his her or her view, such policy and procedure is reasonably designed to ensure that the firm complies with the relevant law or rule, as he or she will, at a minimum, sign the Annual Compliance Report, let alone possibly certify it. In any case it is likely that the CEO, if he or she certifies the Annual Compliance Report, will rely on the CCO’s signature as back-up to his or her own certification.

If there is a necessary Compliance Policy that is deemed deficient or missing, now is the time to fix it (if relevant) by writing a new or amending an existing policy or procedure. Otherwise the deficiency will have to be identified as existing as of year-end even if it will then be in the process of being remediated. Strict deadlines should be set by the CCO (or designee) to draft new or more complete policies or procedures and these deadlines should be monitored actively.

Step 3: Assess whether the Compliance Policies were effective

In the next column (or another area) the CCO should provide an assessment whether each Compliance Policy is, in fact effective. This requires a real-world evaluation.

There are only a few possible outcomes, depending on whether an applicable policy exists in the first place. The policy is working reasonably as designed, it is partially effective, or it is not effective at all. One of these outcomes should be reflected in this column although it is very possible that an initial assessment may change over time before the final Annual Compliance Report is prepared.

As before, unless the relevant law or regulation relates to an area under the CCO’s primary jurisdiction, the CCO likely will want to obtain a sub-representation from the relevant department head regarding this matter, and have him or her reflect his or her views in writing. However, again, the CCO must provide an independent view as to the reasonableness of the department head’s views.

This is the first section of the Annual Compliance Report that likely may cause registrants serious angst. This is because, typically, all senior managers, including the CCO, hear rumors or informal complaints of potential compliance issues all year long that range from coffee chat grousing to substantive allegations.

Moreover, during the course of the relevant fiscal year, a registrant will likely have received various formal compliance reviews, internal or external audit findings, self-reported errors, and validated complaints (including those initiated through the firm’s whistle-blower process) as well as learn of regulatory investigations or actions, or private lawsuits that may reasonably suggest that a Compliance Policy is not working 100% as intended.

At a minimum, these matters should be considered before the relevant officer, including the CCO, attests to the efficacy of a related Compliance Policy. After the fact, for example, it could be somewhat problematic for one senior officer to have signed off that a particular Compliance Policy has been reasonably effective, if the firm’s Internal Audit Department previously issued a report saying that the same policy was routinely disobeyed and a recommendation for remediation has not yet been implemented — especially if there is internal evidence that the senior officer received the report (whether or not he or she read it)!

As a result, it may be helpful to include another column on the firm’s spreadsheet (or other area), where the CCO correlates internally identified issues (including source, date and remediation action) and externally initiated matters with the relevant provision of the CEA or CFTC regulation and the relevant Compliance Policy in order to ensure that nothing stated in the Annual Compliance Report may be inconsistent with other known documents or information. Such a section will also help the CCO more easily identify material compliance issues that must be included in another section of the Annual Compliance Report provided to the CFTC. At a minimum, the CCO should carefully review all internally identified issues and externally initiated matters prior to signing the Annual Compliance Report.

Moreover, where a CCO or another senior manager may have a different view as to the efficacy of a specific Compliance Policy now is the time for internal discussions to be held. Ideally, these discussions will be held in person and not confrontational. Preferably e-mail or instant messaging will not be used to conduct such meetings, as these are poor media to reach consensus or adequately to express disagreements.

Step 4: Determine any material changes there have been to the Compliance Policies during the fiscal year

The next column (or other area) should reflect any material changes to relevant Compliance Policies adopted by the firm during the relevant fiscal year. At a minimum, listed here should be reflected (1) any new, or material amendments to, any required Compliance Policy that were noted as missing in the prior year’s Annual Compliance Report, as well as (2) each new Compliance Policy adopted to reflect material amendments to the CEA or CFTC rules (including new provisions) during the relevant fiscal year.

Again, the CCO should receive this information from relevant department heads, except where he or she has primary jurisdiction over the relevant subject matter.

Step 5: Assess what changes might make the firm’s Compliance Program more effective including additional resources

The last column (or equivalent) is where the CCO should reflect what the CCO believes is necessary to close any gaps identified in the prior two columns (or areas). Here the CCO should recommend specifically:

  1. any potential amendments to Compliance Policies so that the firm will have policies and procedures better designed to comply with all applicable provisions of law or regulations; and
  2. any changes or improvements to the implementation of a Compliance Policy, or additional resources, designed to enable the firm better to comply with all applicable provisions of the CEA or regulations.

Again, the CCO should not prepare this section in a vacuum. Except where he or she has primary knowledge, the CCO likely will want to obtain information regarding how to improve Compliance Policies or the implementation of policies from the relevant department heads. In the first instance, the department head should typically acknowledge in writing agreement with any language proposed to be used in the final Annual Compliance Report related to possible improvements. However, again, the CCO must evaluate independently the reasonableness of the department head’s views.

Typically, if the CCO carefully explains the requirements of a law or rule, relevant management and the CCO can reach agreement on the most effective way designed to achieve compliance. Not always will adding personnel or other resources enhance compliance; sometimes compliance can be enhanced by better training personnel or utilizing better-trained persons, or simply by better understanding the actual requirements. On the other hand, the firm may need to expend some additional resources to fix some matters, including hiring more personnel or obtaining more or better automation. It may be helpful in connection with this process to use an external objective resource to help mediate different opinions.

The next two sections that the CFTC requires in the Annual Compliance Report appear satisfied by a narrative or separate summary that can be at least partially derived from the information included in the previously discussed chart.

Step 6: Determine the financial, managerial, operational and staffing resources the Firm employs to comply with relevant provision of the CEA and Commission regulations and assess if there are any material deficiencies and if so, what are they

First, the CCO is required to provide a description of the financial, managerial, operational and staffing resources the firm employs to comply with the relevant provisions of law and CFTC rules, including a description of any material deficiencies in such resources. This would seem to entail the CCO first (1) computing the dollar value of all resources the firm uses to comply with its compliance obligations, including personnel (both in and outside the Compliance Department) and systems; (2) counting the number of employees in each department that perform compliance relevant functions; and (3) understanding all elements of the firm’s training and supervisory structure day to day to designed to ensure compliance or to identify problems. It will also be helpful for the CCO to (4) prepare an inventory of all automated systems the firm uses to assist its compliance efforts, as well as (5) understand the role of each permanent or periodic control function (e.g., Internal Audit, Compliance, Operational Risk) to help detect and correct any issues.

However, in connection with this requirement, the CFTC has given CCO’s some flexibility. It says,

“This rule requires a description of compliance resources, but does not prescribe the form or manner of this description, which the Commission views as within the reasonable discretion of the registrant.”

(77 Federal Register No. 64, pg. 20164.)

Again, the CCO likely will have to rely on other department heads to provide to him or her much of this information.

Step 7: Identify material non-compliance issues that emerged during the preparation of the Annual Compliance Report, and summarize what actions were taken in response, if any

Second, the CCO is obligated in the Annual Compliance Report to describe any “material non-compliance issues identified” and the corresponding action taken. The plain language and Federal Register discussion regarding this provision are not 100% clear regarding the meaning of this section. Presumably the disclosure requirement pertains to compliance issues discovered solely during preparation of the Annual Compliance Report, but includes any discovered violation of the CEA or CFTC rules, and not just a failure to have an adequate Compliance Policy.

For this section the CCO should be able mostly to draw on the information previously assembled as part of the analysis of the efficacy of existing Compliance Policies. However, only material non-compliance issues need to be disclosed in this section of the Annual Compliance Report, not all compliance issues.

Again, not all the information assembled for internal purposes needs to be included in the actual Annual Compliance Report signed by the CCO, certified by the CEO or CCO, and provided to the Commission. In fact, most of the information likely will not be included. Rather, only those specific sections required by the CFTC (described in Section B, above) need to be provided. However, preparation of an internal spreadsheet or other document, containing the type of information described above in this Section C will make it easier ultimately to produce this report, let alone identify potential issues earlier. This internal document, and all supporting documentation. however, needs to be retained in the ordinary course and is likely discoverable if there is a regulatory or private dispute down the road.

When the CCO drafts the actual report he or she should consider a format that enables the CFTC readily to see each section it expects. Information should be accurate and language should be measured, neither overstating nor understating any matter.

After preparing the firm’s Annual Compliance Report, the CCO needs to provide a copy that he or she signs to the firm’s Board of Directors or senior officer. Although it seems contemplated that the CCO should discuss the Annual Compliance Report formally with the Board of the senior officer, such a discussion is not formally mandated. However, it appears reasonable that such a discussion should occur.

The Board’s minutes or some other official records (particularly in case of a presentation to the senior officer only) should reflect that there was a presentation of the Annual Compliance Report.

D. CCO or CEO Certification

At any time after the CCO signs the annual report, the CCO or the CEO must certify it, acknowledging formally, that to the best of his or her knowledge and belief, and under penalty of law, the information in the Annual Compliance Report is accurate and correct. Again, if the CCO does not certify the report him or herself, it is likely the CEO will rely on the CCO’s signature to support his or her own certification. Whoever certifies the Annual Compliance Report must apply independent judgment and consider matters of which he or she is aware that are likely to make a certification not true.

Importantly, the Commission notes that the certification is not a guarantee that all information in the Annual Compliance Report is accurate. It is simply a warranty that a process was followed reasonably designed to ensure accuracy. According to the CFTC,

“’If the certifying officer has complied in good faith with policies and procedures reasonably designed to confirm the accuracy and completeness of the information in the annual report both the registrant and the certifying officer would have a basis for defending accusations of false, incomplete, or misleading statements or representations made in the annual report.”

(77 Federal Register No. 64, pg. 20163.)

As a result of this guidance by the CFTC, it may be helpful to include in the Annual Compliance Report a description of the process that was followed to prepare the report.

The firm’s Annual Compliance Report should then be furnished electronically to the CFTC by not more than 90 days after the end of the fiscal year of the FCM, SD or MSP, or at the same time, the registrant submits its annual audited financial statement. For stand alone FCMs this is 90 days after the end of its fiscal year; for combined BD FCMs this is 60 days after the end of the fiscal year. Electronic filings are made through the Winjammer ™ system. (NFA Notice to Members, Notice 1-13-07 (March 8, 2013.)

If subsequent to filing, a material error is discovered in the Annual Compliance Report, the report promptly must be amended and re-filed along with a new CEO or CCO certification.

An FCM, SD or MSP may apply to the CFTC for an extension to file the Annual Compliance Report provided the firm’s “…failure to timely furnish the report could not be eliminated by the registrant without unreasonable effort or expense.” (CFTC Regulations §3.3(f)(5).)

Any Annual Compliance Report may incorporate by reference sections of the Annual Compliance Report furnished within the current or immediately preceding reporting period. Thus for Annual Compliance Reports filed this year, cross-reference to sections may be made to the Annual Compliance Report filed for firm’s last fiscal year. Next year, references may be made to the Annual Compliance Report filed for this and the last fiscal year of the firm. If a firm is registered in more than one category of an FCM, SD, or MSP, its Annual Compliance Report filed for one registration category may also cross reference sections made in another registration category’s report for the current or immediately preceding period. (CFTC Regulations §3.3(f)(6).)

When a firm submits its Annual Compliance Report to the CFTC it may request that it be subject to confidential information just as with the submission of other documents containing proprietary information.

Annual Compliance Reports must be retained in the ordinary course (i.e., for five years, two years readily accessible), along with:

  1. all policies and procedures identified, reasonably designed to ensure compliance with all the firm’s CEA and CFTC Rules’ obligations;
  2. copies of all materials provided to the Board of Directors or senior officer in connection with their review of the Annual Compliance Report; and
  3. copies of all “records relevant to the annual report,” including work papers and documents that form the basis of the report. This includes, but is not limited to, “memoranda, correspondence, other documents and records that are created, sent or received in connection with the report and contain conclusions, analyses, or financial data related to the annual report.”

(CFTC Regulations §3.3(g)(1)(i-iii).)

E. Bottom Line

Preparation of annual compliance reports is not new in the financial services industry. Broker Dealers have been required for some time to file an Annual Certification of Compliance and Supervisory Processes with FINRA, although such certification is certified exclusively by the firm’s CEO (FINRA Rule §3130), while the CCO of an investment company must provide no less than annually, a report to the fund’s board of directors that addresses certain minimum compliance matters; this report is not automatically provided to the SEC (SEC Rules, §270.38a-1(a)(4)(iii). In the futures industry, designated clearing organizations, swap data repositories, and swap execution facilities must also prepare annual compliance reports containing similar information as required by FCMs, MSPs and SDs, and submit such reports to the CFTC too. ((CFTC Rules §39.10(c)(3-4) and §37.1501(e), respectively.) Each DCO and FCM in existence by the end of 2012 already has submitted one Annual Compliance Report to the CFTC, although for FCMs, this was an abbreviated one addressing only customer funds protection. (See, CFTC No Action Letter 13-03.)

The preparation of a firm’s Annual Compliance Report should be undertaken in a very meticulous and thoughtful manner by each firm, because of the serious disclosure regarding the firm that will be provided to the CFTC, as well as the certification that must be provided by the CEO or CCO, which exposes the certifier to potential criminal or civil liability. Given this importance, it would not be unexpected that legitimate differences of opinion might arise at various points during the report’s preparation. As a result, it is important that these differences, as well as any issues with the firm’s Compliance Policies, or material compliance issues that the firm may have, be identified and begin to be remediated as soon as possible. In many case, an outside independent person may be in a better position than internal staff to assist the firm analyzing and helping to resolve these issues as well as any internal differences of opinion.

For questions or assistance, do not hesitate to contact Gary DeWaal and Associates at (212) 382-4615 or at http://www.garydewaalandassociates.com/request/

The information contained in this article is not legal advice. For legal advice, please consult with your attorney. The information in this article is derived from sources believed to be reliable as of August 31, 2013, but no representation or warranty is made regarding the accuracy of any statement.